The Welfare State and the Social Rights of Asylum Seekers and Refugees in Comparative Perspective: The Cases of Sweden, Germany, and the United Kingdom by Archer, Claire
THE WELFARE STATE AND THE SOCIAL RIGHTS OF ASYLUM SEEKERS AND 
REFUGEES IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE: THE CASES OF SWEDEN, 
GERMANY, AND THE UNITED KINGDOM  
Claire A. Archer 
A thesis submitted to the faculty of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in partial 
fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in the Department of Political 
Science, Concentration European Governance. 
Chapel Hill 
2015 
 
 
Approved by:  
John Stephens 
Donald Searing 
Rahsaan Maxwell 
 
	  	  
ii	  
	  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© 2015 
Claire A. Archer 
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
	  	  
iii 
	  
ABSTRACT
Claire A. Archer: The Welfare State and the Social Rights of  
Asylum Seekers and Refugees in Comparative Perspective:  
The Cases of Sweden, Germany, and the United Kingdom 
(Under the direction of John Stephens) 
This thesis examines reception conditions for asylum applicants and social rights for 
refugees and non-EU legal immigrants across the United Kingdom, Germany, and Sweden. 
These countries are among the top asylum recipients in the EU, but each exemplifies a different 
welfare state typology: liberal, Christian democratic, and social democratic, respectively. The 
thesis rests on the analytical assumption that welfare regime affects immigrants’ social rights, 
but also explores the impact of incorporation regime (inclusive vs. exclusive policies) and “entry 
categories” to determine how these influence immigrants’ access to benefits. 
There are considerable differences across the regimes, but in all three cases asylum 
seekers receive minimal material support and face barriers to labor market participation. There 
are huge discrepancies between social rights granted to various entry categories, with asylum 
seekers always at the bottom, admitted refugees near the top, and third-country nationals 
somewhere in between, depending on the welfare and incorporation regimes. 
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION
` In the past few decades the European Union (EU) has received massive inflows of 
refugees, first from the Baltic States and collapsing communist regimes in the early 1990s and 
now from conflict areas in the Middle East and North Africa. In 2014, the 28 Member States of 
the EU (EU-28) received 626,065 asylum applicants, an increase of 191,000 applications, or 44 
percent more than the previous year (Bitoulas 2015). In 2013, over 100,000 new applications 
were lodged in the EU-28, a 32 percent increase compared with 2012 (Bitoulas 2014). In 2014, 
like in the previous year, Germany was the largest single recipient of new asylum claims among 
the EU-28; in 2014, it recorded an over 60 percent increase in asylum applications compared 
with 2013, equivalent to over 80,000 new applications (Bitoulas 2015). 
Given the high numbers of new arrivals, the provision of adequate welfare for asylum 
applicants, in order to facilitate their integration into their new societies, has never been more 
important. The Common European Asylum System (CEAS) was designed in the early 2000s as a 
means to harmonize national asylum systems and reduce differences between EU Member 
States on the basis of binding EU legislation. Specifically, the CEAS was supposed to prevent 
“asylum shopping” and to fix numerous problems stemming from large differences in national 
asylum systems. However, after the final round of implementation of the CEAS in 2014, national 
asylum systems still differ significantly in many areas of asylum and immigration policy, 
including reception conditions and benefit access.  
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This thesis will examine differences in reception conditions for asylum applicants and 
formal social rights for admitted refugees and non-EU legal immigrants1 in the United Kingdom 
(UK), Germany, and Sweden. It will also explore whether implementation of CEAS Directives 
has had any substantive effects on the social rights of asylum seekers and refugees. The UK, 
Germany, and Sweden are excellent cases for comparison because they are among the top 
asylum recipients in the EU in terms of absolute and relative numbers, but each exemplifies a 
different welfare state typology: liberal, Christian democratic, and social democratic, 
respectively. This thesis rests on the analytical assumption that welfare regime type affects 
immigrants’ social rights. However, examining their social rights through the lens of social 
policy alone does not provide a full picture. It is also necessary to analyze the impact of each 
country’s incorporation regime – rules and norms that determine immigrants’ inclusion and 
exclusion – on immigrants’ social rights, as well as to analyze the impact of forms of 
immigration, or “entry categories.” This thesis focuses on three entry categories in particular, to 
examine how various forms of immigration – here asylum seekers, refugees, and non-EU legal 
immigrants – entail specific rights and influence immigrants’ access to social benefits.  
First, this thesis will explore what reception conditions exist for asylum seekers – that is, 
while they wait for a decision on their asylum applications, what each welfare state provides in 
terms of access to housing, healthcare, education, and the labor market, as well as social benefits 
and transfers. In almost all EU Member States, including the three countries studied here, 
asylum seekers’ benefits are fully separated from mainstream welfare benefits and/or subject to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
1 This thesis uses the terms non-EU immigrant and third-country national interchangeably to refer to 
individuals who are neither from the EU country in which they are currently living or staying, nor from 
other Member States of the European Union – that is, they are from a “third” country. They are not EU 
citizens and do not enjoy the rights derived from EU citizenship. In the EU context, the term third-
country national is distinguished from its usage in international migration literature, where it typically 
refers to individuals who are in transit and/or applying for visas in countries that are not their country of 
origin in order to go to destination countries that are also not their country of origin. For example, a 
Venezuelan national applying for an American visa in Spain is considered a third-country national in 
international migration circles, and for the purposes of US visa law.  
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distinct rules and limitations. Comparing reception conditions and asylum support across three 
different welfare states and incorporation regimes can illuminate how these regimes affect 
asylum seekers’ social rights. Furthermore, the UK, Germany, and Sweden are each subject to 
some version of the EU’s common asylum legislation. Both the original and the recast versions 
of the Reception Conditions Directive of the CEAS aim to improve and harmonize living 
standards for asylum applicants across the EU, essentially establishing minimum social rights 
that should be provided for asylum seekers across all Member States. As such, comparing 
reception conditions in the UK, Germany, and Sweden will be a valuable way to determine 
whether adherence to the CEAS has actually led to substantive changes in national policies and 
what differences persist across these welfare regimes. In other words, even though these 
countries have distinct welfare and incorporation regimes, have the Directives of the CEAS 
harmonized the social rights of asylum seekers across Member States of the EU? 
Second, the thesis will look at the social rights granted to admitted refugees across the 
three countries, including access to education, healthcare, housing benefits, and the labor 
market, in addition to the provision of social benefits. Third, it will examine the social rights of 
non-EU legal immigrants in order to situate refugee and asylum seeker experiences in the 
context of benefits afforded to other immigrant entry categories. It is valuable to compare rights 
among the three entry categories to determine how forms of immigration affect access to 
benefits. Across the three countries, asylum seekers are generally at the bottom of the spectrum, 
while admitted refugees are at the top, on par with or very close to citizens, and non-EU legal 
immigrants are somewhere in between, depending on how the country’s welfare and 
incorporation regimes affect their social rights.  
Much of the previous research into immigration and welfare has focused on immigration 
and the challenges it presents to the welfare state, but few studies have explored the social rights 
of asylum seekers, refugees, and immigrants. Fewer still have done this through the lens of 
welfare state typologies and immigrant incorporation regimes. This thesis is also unique because 
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it incorporates the EU dimension, in order to discern whether national welfare states have 
adapted their protections for asylum seekers and refugees in response to EU Directives.  
Asylum policies within EU Member States are important for two reasons. First, asylum 
policies across EU Member States reflect the success – or not – of the CEAS and EU 
harmonization in this policy area. Overall, EU competences in the field of immigration and 
welfare policies are limited in those Member States that have not adopted the EU’s legal 
migration Directives (Denmark, Ireland, and UK). Although the EU has increased its 
competences in non-EU legal migration recently, all Member States retain control over the 
numbers of third-country nationals they will accept for employment purposes, and all Member 
States design and implement social welfare systems and policies as they choose (EMN 2014). 
Given the complicated mix of competences between Member States and the EU, an 
important question that this thesis will explore is whether implementation of EU Directives in 
asylum and non-EU migration policy have affected refugees’ and third-country nationals’ social 
rights. The EU has competences in asylum seekers’ reception and admission, but much less 
involvement in national immigrant incorporation policies. However, given the growing 
importance of immigration in EU and national discourse, it will be interesting to investigate 
whether the social rights afforded to admitted refugees and third-country nationals have 
changed in each national case, perhaps in response to EU pressures or in response to anti-
asylum and anti-refugee rhetoric in national political discourse.  
The second, and even more important, reason to study asylum policies is that social 
rights granted to asylum applicants and refugees and the success of these welfare states in 
ensuring that these individuals are well integrated figures heavily into the future of European 
societies. Social security systems comprise one of the most powerful tools to reduce poverty and 
inequality and to foster social inclusion and dignity. By protecting individuals against specific 
social risks, such as unemployment, sickness, and disability, social security systems improve 
productivity and support sustainable economic growth. Even though EU Member States share a 
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common interest to promote the well-being of their populations through effective welfare 
provision, their rules on who has access to social security and healthcare, which benefits are 
granted, and under what conditions vary considerably (Jonjić and Mavrodi 2012, 5). 
At the same time, anti-immigrant, and, in particular, anti-asylum, rhetoric has increased 
across EU Member States. Especially after the 2008 economic crisis, the general climate of 
social discontent and economic hardship has worsened, and immigrants have become an easy 
target for restrictive policies. Even Sweden, typically lauded for its successful refugee and 
immigrant integration policies, has experienced new tensions lately with a rise in inequality and 
the increasing popularity of the far-right, anti-immigrant Sweden Democrats in 2014 elections 
(Eddy 2015). Anti-immigrant sentiment and asylum controversy seem to be rising in all three of 
the countries studied in this thesis, while for the most part, the social benefits of immigrants are 
diminishing due to heavy cuts in public expenditures overall, but especially in those dedicated to 
immigrant integration (Jonjić and Mavrodi 2012, 8).  
For these reasons, this thesis is relevant and timely. By investigating welfare benefits for 
asylum seekers and refugees in three ideal-type welfare states in the EU, it will explore 
commonalities and differences between national systems in three of the largest asylum-
recipients in the EU. In doing so, it will consider solutions for improving the system as a whole – 
that is, replicating positive policies and harmonizing conditions to improve outcomes for asylum 
seekers across the EU and for EU Member States looking toward the future.
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CHAPTER II: BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW
The theoretical background of this thesis integrates three areas of existing literature: 
comparative research on welfare states, literature on immigration regimes and immigrant entry 
categories (and the ways these intersect with welfare regime types), and literature on EU 
competences in migration and asylum policy and their influence on social rights for asylum 
seekers and third-country nationals. First, the background section will explain the key 
dimensions of Esping-Andersen’s welfare state typology, which include: decommodification; 
stratifying effects of social policies; relationships between the state, market, and family in social 
provision; and finally, dynamics between the welfare state and the structure of employment. 
Next, it will explain Diane Sainsbury’s research that compares immigrants’ social rights across 
welfare states. Her analytical framework utilizes comparative welfare state research in 
combination with research into immigrants’ social rights. In particular, she analyzes 
immigration/incorporation regimes along a spectrum of inclusion vs. exclusion and examines 
different entry categories and what rights are afforded to each category. The theoretical 
background of this thesis as a whole is deeply informed by her work. Finally, the background 
section will briefly discuss EU legislation in the realm of asylum and migration policy, including 
the historical development of EU competences and what current legislation means for Member 
States in practice. Here it is particularly important to understand the components of the CEAS 
in order to understand how common EU legislation could affect national asylum systems and 
social rights for asylum seekers, if fully implemented. 
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Welfare State Regimes  
Esping-Andersen’s Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (1990), the seminal work in 
welfare regime typologies, identifies three distinct welfare state regimes: liberal (or market-
oriented) welfare states typical of the Anglo-American democracies, the Christian Democratic 
regime emblematic of continental Europe, and the Nordic social democratic model. They differ 
with respect to how they respond to social inequalities generated by the market (and by 
extension by their relative generosity and spending), the ways they condition and regulate wage 
distribution and job insecurities that the market is allowed to generate, and by their institutional 
logic for distributing welfare functions between the state, the market, and the family (Myles and 
Quadagno 2002; Stephens and Huber 2010). Put another way, Sainsbury (2012) pulls out four 
principal dimensions of variation in Esping-Andersen’s typology. The first and most important 
dimension – decommodification – refers to an individual’s ability to enjoy an acceptable 
standard of living independently of his or her participation in the market. The second dimension 
comprises the stratifying effects of social policies. Esping-Andersen explains that the “welfare 
state is not just a mechanism that intervenes in, and possibly corrects, the structure of 
inequality; it is, in its own right, a system of stratification. It is an active force in the ordering of 
social relations” (Esping-Andersen 1990, 23). The third dimension includes the relationships 
between the state, market, and family in social provision, and the fourth encompasses the 
dynamics between the welfare state and the structure of employment (Sainsbury 2012, 10).  
In liberal welfare states, usually exemplified by the United States and the UK, citizens are 
considered individual market actors who are encouraged to obtain their welfare in the market, 
for example, through subsidies for private welfare benefits. Liberal regimes are extremely 
reluctant to replace market relations with social rights. Basic security schemes tend to be 
means-tested and targeted to a limited clientele of the needy, and social insurance schemes offer 
only modest benefits. Liberal states actively and passively encourage market solutions; passively 
by guaranteeing only a bare minimum of benefits, which are actually lower than the wages of the 
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working poor, and actively by subsidizing private welfare arrangements (Sainsbury 2012, 23). 
Liberal social policies tend to stratify the poor and the non-poor and have few de-commodifying 
effects (Esping-Andersen 1990; Miles and Quadagno 2002; Sainsbury 2012). 
Christian Democratic welfare states – also often called conservative, corporatist, or 
Bismarckian2 – offer universal coverage (at least historically) but provide different benefits 
under different programs, with rights to benefits based on employment categories, class, and 
status, and by public financing or subsidizing of privately provided services. Although social 
spending in Christian democratic states is considerably higher than in liberal states and social 
rights are extensive, the primary focus is on income transfers that preserve the income and 
status of the traditional male breadwinner, and there is only a minimal role for private welfare 
arrangements (the market). Given the focus on the traditional family model with the man at the 
head, social services that assist with women’s employment (i.e., child care) and provide jobs for 
women are modest.  
Like Christian democratic states, social democratic welfare states leave a marginal role 
for private welfare provision, but provide extensive, universal coverage for citizens, emphasizing 
equality of citizenship instead of preserving status differences between occupational groups. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
2 The continental European countries are variously referred to as conservative, corporatist, Bismarckian, 
or Christian Democratic, depending on the characteristics being emphasized. The term corporatist is used 
more often by comparative Europeanists to describe the regime’s type of wage bargaining system in which 
employers’ organizations and union confederations, as well as wage bargaining, are highly centralized. 
The term conservative is generally employed in the classic European sense of the term, highlighting the 
regime’s pre-capitalist origins in the dynastic elites of continental Europe. The continental European 
regimes were decidedly anti-liberal in origin, not at all concerned with market efficiency, but rather with 
maintaining an organic-hierarchical social order inherited from the past. Historically rights and privileges 
were differentiated on the basis of class and status, and redistribution was marginal (Myles and Quadagno 
2002). Today, the term conservative is also used to describe continental European regimes with reference 
to their gender policies, although it does not apply in this regard to Belgium and France. The term 
Bismarckian primarily refers to the social insurance tradition – begun by Otto von Bismarck – of status-
maintaining mandatory public pensions; however, the main social transfer systems in Norway, Sweden, 
and Finland are also Bismarckian in their structures, so the term “Bismarckian” is rather opaque. This 
thesis utilizes the most encompassing of all the terms: Christian democratic. Although “Christian 
democratic” applies somewhat ambiguously to France (a majority Catholic country), the historical 
prominence of Christian democratic parties in the continental European countries has led to a distinct 
welfare regime type and policy outcomes, as is explained in the main text.  
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Even though both social democratic and Christian democratic welfare states tend to spend a lot 
on social protection they do so in fundamentally different ways (Miles and Quadagno 2002). 
Social democratic welfare states (found mainly in Scandinavia) emphasize redistribution and 
provide high levels of income security to all citizens. These regimes tie welfare to work; they 
commit to full employment and remain entirely dependent on its attainment as a source of 
continued funding (Esping-Andersen 1990). Because women’s – and everyone’s – place is in the 
labor market, the welfare state is service intensive as well as transfer intensive. Social services 
provide employment for women as well as childcare and other services that facilitate women’s or 
parents’ labor market participation (Huber and Stephens 2000; Myles and Quadagno 2002). 
Social democratic and Christian democratic welfare states have created well-entrenched 
collective bargaining structures that limit wage dispersion and regulatory institutions that limit 
employers’ abilities to hire and fire at will (Myles and Quadagno 2002).  
The ways in which each regime assigns welfare provision among state, market, 
community, and family reflect certain value commitments and views about the desirable 
relationship between these elements. For example, the liberal regime reflects the values of 
individual responsibility and efficiency, and the view that the state should primarily rely on 
market forces and work with these forces to prevent destitution and provide essential social 
services. The Christian democratic regime rejects the primacy of the market, and instead reflects 
the Catholic doctrine of harmony and subsidiarity, where the state is responsible for keeping 
people out of poverty but not for altering the social order. The family is viewed as the locus of 
social order and social welfare; therefore the state only performs the functions that are not 
performed well by the family or civil society. Finally, the social democratic regime reflects the 
values of solidarity and equality, and the view that the state is charged with counteracting 
market forces to realize these values (Stephens and Huber 2010). Many scholars have criticized 
Esping-Andersen’s typology for disregarding or oversimplifying more complex aspects of 
welfare regimes and for ignoring key aspects of the gendered logic of welfare regimes (Ostner 
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and Lewis 1995; Sainsbury 1996; O’Connor, Orloff, and Shaver 1999); however, his central 
insight about the institutional logic for distributing welfare functions among the state, market, 
and family remains remarkably robust (Orloff 1996; Myles and Quadagno 2002).  
 
Immigrant Incorporation Regimes  
Welfare regimes alone do not fully explain immigrants’ social rights within the welfare 
state. Diane Sainsbury, a comparativist and a scholar of welfare and social policy, has published 
extensively about immigrants in the welfare state. Rather than focusing on the impact of 
immigration on national welfare systems as most scholars do, Sainsbury studies the impact of 
national welfare systems on immigrants’ social rights and well-being. Her major body of 
research concerning immigrants and the welfare state, Welfare States and Immigrant Rights 
(2012), begins from the fundamental premise that the type of welfare state has a large impact on 
immigrants’ social rights. Utilizing Esping-Andersen’s welfare regime typology as a point of 
departure, she adds two analytical constructs from international migration literature: the 
immigration policy regime, or incorporation regime, and entry categories associated with the 
form of immigration.  
An immigration policy regime, or incorporation regime, regulates immigrants’ inclusion 
in or exclusion from society. It “consists of rules and norms that govern immigrants’ possibilities 
to become a citizen, to acquire residence and work permits, and to participate in economic, 
cultural and political life” (Sainsbury 2006, 230). Previous scholars have identified four types of 
regime, including the imperial regime, the ethnic regime, the republican regime, and the 
multicultural regime (Castles and Miller 1993; Baldwin-Edwards and Schain 1994; Williams 
1995; Kofman et al. 2000). Building upon these, authors have also described policy models for 
managing ethnic diversity, such as the differential exclusionary model, the assimilationist 
model, and the multicultural model (Castles and Miller 1998, 244-50). Critics of these ideal type 
models point out that in reality policies tend to mix features and that integration and citizenship 
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policies are characterized by convergence, which tends to undermine the usefulness of such 
models entirely (Joppke and Morawska 2003).  
Rather than categorize immigration regimes in terms of ideal types, Sainsbury (2006; 
2012) describes them along a spectrum of inclusiveness. To this she adds an analysis of the form 
of immigration, or entry category, which typically has a large bearing on immigrants’ access to 
social benefits. The most important entry categories she identifies are labor or economic 
migrants, refugees and asylum seekers or political immigrants, ethnic “citizens,” and 
undocumented immigrants. For example, refugees with Convention status3 receive the same 
treatment as nationals with regard to public assistance and social security benefits, whereas 
undocumented immigrants and asylum seekers have either no or minimal claims to social 
entitlements. In other words, “entry categories create a hierarchical differentiation of 
immigrants’ social rights, and the pattern of stratification is quite different from the stratifying 
effects conceptualized in the welfare regime typology” (Sainsbury 2006, 230).  
The rights of Convention refugees are usually on par with those of citizens, and because 
of their protected legal status, refugees’ rights are less vulnerable to welfare state retrenchment. 
The type of welfare regime has essentially the same impact on their rights as it does on the rights 
of citizens. In contrast, the rights of asylum seekers are very tenuous and have diminished in 
recent years (Sainsbury 2006, 240); in all three cases in this study, asylum seekers cannot 
access mainstream welfare benefits.  This thesis examines the impact of welfare regime, 
incorporation regime, and entry category on the social rights granted to asylum seekers and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
3 A refugee with Convention status refers to an individual who has been designated a refugee based on the 
definition established by the United Nations’ 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees. The 1951 
Convention defines a refugee as: a person who, “owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for 
reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is 
outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of 
the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his 
former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return 
to it” (UNHCR 2010). 
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refugees (although one necessarily follows the other) and compares these to the rights of citizens 
and third-country nationals in each national case.  
Based on Sainsbury’s comparison of welfare regime and incorporation regime variations, 
the three cases of interest in this study are set out in the table below. 
 
Table 1 – Welfare and Incorporation Regimes of Case Studies  
Country Welfare regime Immigration policy regime 
United Kingdom Liberal 
Rights based on need 
Restrictive 
Rights based on (limited) ius soli 
Germany Christian Democratic 
Rights based on work 
Exclusionary 
Rights based on lineage (ius sanguinis) 
Sweden Social Democratic 
Rights based on citizenship 
Inclusive 
Rights based on residence (ius domicilii) 
 
Sainsbury’s research into each national case will also factor heavily into the country analyses 
found in Chapter Four.  
 
Common EU Legislation in Asylum and Migration  
This section explores the historical development of EU competences in asylum and 
migration, particularly EU legislation as it deals with social rights and benefits for asylum 
seekers, refugees, and third-country nationals. Of course, Sweden, Germany, and the UK have 
each implemented – or often not, in the case of the UK – EU Directives differently, but 
understanding what EU measures exist is an important foundation for the deeper country 
analyses in Chapter Four.  
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Historical Development of EU Competence in Asylum  
The EU’s first efforts to cooperate on refugee and asylum policy began in the early 1990s 
in response to the rising number of refugees fleeing the Yugoslav Wars and the collapse of 
communist regimes in Eastern Europe (ECRE 2013). In 1985 the Schengen Agreement planned 
for the gradual removal of Europe’s internal borders to enable the free movement of goods and 
people within the European Community. In 1992 the Maastricht Treaty created the EU’s pillar 
structure and extended its powers in migration and asylum for the first time. A new third pillar, 
Justice and Home Affairs (JHA), established a legal structure for intergovernmental cooperation 
in many areas, including asylum and migration of non-EU nationals. In order to achieve one of 
its key objectives – the free movement of people – Member States recognized that asylum and 
immigration policy had become a matter of common interest for members of the EU (UK 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office 2014). 
In 1997 the Treaty of Amsterdam (ToA) moved most JHA policy areas relating to the free 
movement of people (including asylum, migration, and external border controls) into the first 
pillar (European Communities pillar), where the “community method,” or supranational (EU) 
decision-making was strongest (Espinoza and Moraes 2012). The ToA introduced Community 
legislative competence in the field of migration and asylum largely because there was “a general, 
albeit reluctant, acknowledgment that many common problems had a global as well as a 
regional dimension to them with … asylum being a case in point” (Velluti 2014: 13). After a 
transitional period of five years, in which Member States and the Commission shared the right 
to initiate legislation on asylum and immigration, the Commission gained sole right of initiative 
on asylum and immigration matters. The ToA also incorporated the Schengen acquis into EU 
law, which removed internal border controls and harmonized visa policies (UK Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office 2014). Soon after this, the “landmark” moment of EU cooperation on 
asylum and migration was the Tampere Council meeting in October 1999. Here the European 
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Council acknowledged that the “’separate but closely related issues of asylum and migration call 
for a common EU policy’” (Espinoza and Moraes 2012, 158).  
During the first phase of the CEAS, between 1999 and 2005, the EU adopted six 
legislative measures that established minimum standards across Member States on the 
qualification for refugee status, the reception of asylum seekers, and the procedures for granting 
or withdrawing refugee status. They also updated the instruments that established which 
Member State would be responsible for determining an asylum application. Overall, they 
imposed “significantly more detailed obligations on Member States than the old third pillar 
provisions,” (UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office 2014, 17-18). In 2009, the Lisbon Treaty, or 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) further widened the scope for EU 
action in asylum and migration, allowing the EU to develop policies on asylum and on the 
immigration of third country nationals generally rather than merely establishing minimum 
standards. The TFEU constituted a significant widening of the EU’s competences in this area 
(UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office 2014).  
Within a few years of the adoption of the CEAS Directives, the Commission evaluated 
their implementation and found persistent inconsistencies in reception conditions and asylum 
decision trends, even among Member States with comparable systems and similar caseloads 
(Gardella 2013). In 2008, the Commission released “Policy Plan on Asylum: An integrated 
approach to protection across the EU” which was intended as a roadmap for the second phase of 
the CEAS, with a projected completion date at the end of 2012. In its Policy Plan, the 
Commission concluded, “the agreed common minimum standards have not created the desired 
level playing field” (European Commission 2008). The Policy Plan proposed a three-pronged 
strategy to improve the CEAS and promised to continue monitoring the implementation of 
existing provisions. In practice, however, the plan just reiterated the unrealized goals of the first 
phase (Gardella 2013). 
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Per the Commission’s plan, the instruments of the CEAS have undergone review and 
revision in the past few years. Most recently, the European Parliament (EP) adopted final 
measures in June 2013, ending the legislative harmonization process that began in December 
2008 when the Commission presented its first revised proposals in the area of asylum (Pollett et 
al. 2013; ECRE 2013). In its current (and purportedly final) harmonized version, the CEAS 
includes three Directives (the Qualifications Directive, Asylum Procedures Directive, and 
Reception Conditions Directive), the Dublin Regulation, and EURODAC. According to Cecilia 
Malmström, EU Commissioner for Home Affairs from 2010 to 2014, the functions of each of the 
components of the CEAS are as follows: the Qualifications Directive specifies the grounds for 
granting a person international protection and refugee status. Although the 1951 Convention is 
“of course valid … the Directive gives a common interpretation of the original definition of a 
refugee” (Malmström 2013) so that Member States apply that uniform definition to all refugees 
who apply for asylum within their borders. The Asylum Procedures Directive requires that 
Member States adhere to minimum safeguards and standards throughout the process of 
claiming asylum. It includes standards regarding how to apply, how applications will be 
examined, and what help asylum seekers will be given. If asylum seekers are rejected, the 
Asylum Procedures Directive specifies common minimum standards for how they should appeal 
negative decisions, whether they will be allowed to stay in the country where they applied during 
the appeals process, what can be done if they flee, and how to deal with repeated applications.  
The Reception Conditions Directive deals with the conditions asylum seekers experience 
while they wait for their asylum claims to be examined. The Directive is intended to ensure that 
applicants have access to housing, food, healthcare, employment, and medical and psychological 
care (European Commission 2014; Malmström 2013). The recast Reception Conditions 
Directive introduced several important changes with regard to social benefits for asylum 
seekers. It includes strictly delineated rules concerning detention of asylum seekers, stipulates 
that access to employment must be granted within nine months (an improvement to the 
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previous 12 months), and introduces more restrictions for Member States to reduce or withdraw 
material reception conditions. It also specifies more rules on conditions under which applicants 
can receive free legal assistance and representation in appeal procedures and specific rules on 
reception needs of minors and victims of torture (Langer 2014). 
The recast CEAS also includes the Dublin Regulation, which sets out explicit rules for 
determining which Member State will be responsible for processing and deciding an asylum 
case. The system is designed this way to avoid asylum seekers from being sent from one country 
to another, and also to prevent asylum seekers abusing the system by submitting applications 
for asylum in multiple countries. The Member State designated as responsible for the asylum 
application must take charge of the applicant and process the application. According to the 
Dublin Regulation, the criteria for establishing responsibility run, in hierarchical order, from 
family considerations, to recent possession of visa or residence permit in a Member State, to 
whether the applicant has entered the EU irregularly or regularly (European Commission 2014). 
Usually, however, the Member State designated as responsible for the asylum application is the 
Member State through which the asylum seeker first entered the EU.  
Determining where an asylum seeker first entered the EU is possible via the EURODAC 
database, the final component of the CEAS. The EURODAC database, in operation since 2003, 
is an EU-wide fingerprinting system for asylum seekers and migrants who enter the EU illegally. 
When people (over the age of 14) apply for asylum, no matter where they are in the EU, their 
fingerprints are transmitted to the EURODAC central system. If, for example, an asylum seeker 
submits an application in Sweden but his fingerprints were first registered in Italy, the asylum 
seeker will be transferred to Italy, which will take charge of his application for asylum. Asylum 
seekers who are transferred to another Member State to have their asylum application processed 
(due to the stipulations of the Dublin Regulation) are known as “Dublin Cases” (European Court 
of Human Rights 2015; Migration and Home Affairs 2015). The 2013 recast version of the 
Dublin Regulation, the so-called Dublin III Regulation, includes new rules that attempt to 
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ensure that an asylum seeker may not be transferred to a Member State where there is a risk of 
inhumane or degrading treatment. The update also created an early warning system to detect 
and address possible issues in national asylum systems (Malmström 2013). These attempts to 
improve the Dublin Regulation were direct responses to the crises that rapidly developed in Italy 
and Greece in 2012. EURODAC was also updated in 2013 to address data protection concerns 
and to help combat terrorism and serious crime (European Commission 2014; Malmström 
2013). 
 
EU Competence in Non-EU Migration 
In addition to recognizing the need for common EU action on asylum, the 1997 
Amsterdam Treaty and the 1999 Tampere Program extended the EU’s competences in non-EU, 
or third-country national, immigration as well. The EU “immigration policy” as it currently 
stands concerns the entry, residence, and return of non-EU citizens for employment purposes 
(including high-skilled immigrant workers), for purposes of family reunification, and for study 
and research. EU legislation also deals with circular migration, illegal immigration, and return 
and re-admission of non-EU citizens who reside in the EU without authorization (Jonjić and 
Mavrodi 2012). Of course, the EU also wields considerable competences regarding the 
movement and settlement of EU citizens within the EU; EU citizens receive special and more 
favorable treatment than third-country nationals within the legal framework of EU citizenship 
rights. The most important EU Directives relating to third-country nationals, especially their 
provisions for welfare and social benefits, are described in the following paragraphs.  
While agreement on the non-controversial issues of admitting researchers (Directive 
2005/71/EC), high-skilled immigrant workers (Directive 2009/50/EC, the “Blue Card” 
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Directive), and students (Directive 2004/114/EC)4, was relatively easy to achieve, the adoption 
of common binding EU norms on the entry and residence of third-country nationals for the 
purpose of employment has proven far more difficult, and Member States retain high levels of 
discretion with regard to granting social benefits to third-country nationals under these 
Directives. Directive 2011/98/EU created a single procedure for issuing a single residence and 
work permit and established a common set of rights for permit holders. The Single Permit 
Directive mandates that third-country nationals with the permit should receive the same 
treatment as the nationals of the member state where they reside with regard to conditions of 
employment, freedom of association and membership in a labor union or professional 
association, education and vocational training, recognition of professional qualifications, social 
security, healthcare, access to goods and services (including procedures for obtaining housing 
and assistance from employment offices), and tax benefits. The Single Permit Directive does not 
apply in the case of third-country nationals who are already posted in a member state, intra-
company transfers, seasonal workers, asylum seekers, long-term residents, illegal immigrants, 
or third-country nationals awaiting expulsion or removal from a Member State (EMN 2013; 
EMN 2014). 
Directive 2003/86/EC on the right to family reunification, which applies to all Member 
States except the UK, Ireland, and Denmark, specifies that third-country nationals who legally 
reside in a Member State for at least one year and have reasonable prospects for permanent 
residence have the right to bring their non-EU national spouse and minor and unmarried 
children into the country. Spouses have the right to full access to the labor market (at the latest 
one year after their reunification) and both spouses and children have the right to education. 
Five years after their reunification, spouses and children reaching majority are granted 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
4 Council Directive 2004/114/EC on the conditions of admission of third-country nationals for the 
purposes of studies, pupil exchange, unremunerated training or voluntary service, December 2004. The 
Directive does not apply in the UK, Ireland, or Denmark.  
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autonomous residence permits. However, because Member States have significant leeway in 
adapting their national legislation to the Directives’ optional provisions, implementation across 
the EU ranges from liberal to restrictive. For example, Member States may authorize family 
reunification contingent upon certain conditions, such as requiring that the family member’s 
sponsor in country possess stable and regular financial resources and provide adequate 
accommodations and sickness insurance to the family member joining him or her5 (EMN 2014). 
Directive 2003/109/EC concerning the status of third-country nationals who are long-
term residents – one of the founding instruments of the common EU immigration policy within 
the Amsterdam Treaty framework – covers third-country nationals who reside in a Member 
State for purposes other than international and temporary protection, studies and vocational 
training, seasonal employment, and employment for providing cross-border services. Third-
country nationals who reside continuously and lawfully in a member state for at least five years 
acquire the status of long-term resident and are granted equal treatment with the nationals of 
Member States in employment access and employment conditions, education, vocational 
training, recognition of qualifications, and welfare and social benefits. However, Member States 
may decide to restrict long-term residents’ access to employment, education, and welfare and 
social benefits (EMN 2014).  
It is important to note that EU competences in the field of immigration and welfare 
policies are limited in those Member States that have not adopted the EU’s legal migration and 
asylum Directives. Additionally, for all Member States, the decisions on the number of third-
country nationals accepted for the purpose of seeking an employment, and the design and 
implementation of the social welfare systems rests with the respective Member State (EMN 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
5 Germany and the UK have requirements about sponsors possessing sufficient resources and stress the 
principle of no recourse to public funds in applying for social benefits; Sweden has recently added a 
requirement that sponsors possess adequate resources and living space for themselves and their family 
members, but has no restrictions regarding use of public funds.  
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2014). Complicating the implementation and harmonization of EU Directives in asylum and 
migration, the UK and Ireland negotiated a special status with regard to the Treaty of 
Amsterdam’s Title IV issues – “Visas, Asylum, Immigration, and Other Policies Related to the 
Free Movement of Persons” – via three additional Protocols (UK Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office 2014). These Protocols include the Opt-In Protocol (which exempts the Ireland and the 
UK from provisions made under Title IV unless they decide to “opt-in” to a particular measure), 
the Schengen Protocol, and the Frontiers Protocol (which protects their rights to border checks 
on anyone entering the country). Per the conditions of the Schengen Protocol, the UK may 
request to take part in some or all of the provisions of the Schengen acquis, which was fully 
incorporated into EU law with the ToA, too. The UK decided to opt-in to areas of the acquis 
involving police and judicial cooperation but did not opt-in to areas involving visas and border 
control, as successive UK governments believe that the UK’s national interest was “best served” 
by having an independent border and visa policy (UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office 2014).  
Thus, despite significant gains in common EU action and legislation on asylum and 
migration since the Maastricht Treaty, the balance of competences between the EU and the UK 
remains predominantly with the UK. The UK has not opted into the border and visa elements of 
the Schengen acquis, and it participates in very few EU legal migration measures, thanks to its 
Opt-In Protocol there, too. The UK has chosen not to adopt instruments aimed at establishing 
common rules for a range of non-EU migrants, including: workers; students and researchers; 
families (including spouses, underage children, unmarried partners, adult dependent children 
or dependent older relatives); and those who have resided in a Member State long term, 
meaning for at least five years of legal residence (UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office 2014).  
On asylum, the current balance of competence is more complex, because the UK is 
bound by the first round of CEAS but has not opted into all of the second round legislation. The 
UK felt that the recast Directives on Reception Conditions, Asylum Procedures, and 
Qualification would have “significantly weakened” the UK asylum system, “slowing decision 
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making and encouraging unfounded asylum claims” (UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office 
2014, 19). For those recast Directives that it did not opt-in to, the UK remains bound by the 
original minimum standards from the first round. However, it elected to opt-in to the recast 
versions of the Dublin Regulation and the EURODAC Regulation, as well as the Regulation 
establishing the European Asylum Support Office (EASO), an EU Agency that furthers practical 
cooperation on asylum, assists with the implementation of the CEAS, and supports Member 
States that deal with excessive pressures on their asylum systems (UK Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office 2014, 18-19).
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CHAPTER III: METHODOLOGY  
First, this section justifies the choice of national cases studies. Sweden, Germany, and 
the UK each receive some of the highest numbers of asylum applicants within the EU, and each 
exemplifies a different welfare state typology and incorporation regime. Second, the 
methodological section describes the primary resources used for analysis. This thesis relies on 
publicly available sources published by EU bodies and the Member States themselves, which 
offer detailed accounts of reception conditions and integration policies for admitted refugees. In 
addition, many scholars have already published relevant research concerning welfare states and 
immigrant rights. Their analyses assist with this thesis.  
 
National Case Study Justification 
To examine the effects of welfare state regime on refugee and asylum seekers’ social 
rights, this thesis looks at three EU Member States, each with very high numbers of asylum 
seekers and refugees. In the EU in 2013, Germany, Sweden, and the UK, along with France and 
Italy, were among the top recipients of asylum applicants, registering 70 percent of all 
applicants in the EU-28. In 2014, in terms of total numbers of asylum applicants, including first 
time applicants, the UK dropped to sixth position behind Hungary,6 but remains a major 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
6 Hungary recorded almost 25,000 more asylum seekers in 2014 compared with 2013, an almost 130 
percent increase. After Germany, Italy, and Sweden, it was the Member State with the largest increase 
over the previous year. In the fourth quarter of 2014 alone, Hungary recorded an incredible 940 percent 
increase compared with the fourth quarter of 2013. Over 50 percent of asylum applicants in Hungary in 
2014 came from Kosovo (Bitoulas 2015). 
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recipient of asylum seekers and among the top five Member States in terms of number of first 
instance decisions issued in 20147 (Bitoulas 2014; Bitoulas 2015).  
The EU-28 recorded a total of 626,065 asylum applications in 2014, which constitutes a 
44 percent increase, or 191,000 more applications, compared with 2013. Germany recorded the 
highest number of applicants in 2014 (202,645 applicants, or 32 percent of total applicants) 
followed by Sweden (81,180, or 13 percent), Italy (64,625, or 10 percent), France (62,375, or 10 
percent), Hungary (42,775, or 7 percent), and the UK (31,745, or 5 percent). Among almost 
163,000 positive first instance decisions issued in the EU-28 in 2014, Sweden and Germany 
granted the highest number. Based on United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR) data from the first half of 2014, Germany was the largest single recipient of new 
asylum claims among the group of industrialized nations studied by the UNHCR, with 65,700 
new asylum applications registered in the first half of 2014 (UNHCR 2014a). Sweden was by far 
the country with the highest rate of applicants per million inhabitants in 2014, with 8,415 
applicants per million inhabitants, followed by Hungary (4,330), Austria (3,295), Malta (3,180), 
Denmark (2,610), Germany (2,510), and Luxembourg (2,025), The UK registered 461 asylum 
applicants per million inhabitants in 2014 (Bitoulas 2015; Bitoulas 2014). 
In 2014, the EU took a total of almost 360,000 first instance decisions, of which 55 
percent were negative decisions (197,025) and 45 percent were positive decisions (162,770). Of 
the positive decisions taken, 55 percent received refugee status, 34 percent received subsidiary 
protection, and the remaining 11 percent received authorization to stay for humanitarian 
reasons (Bitoulas 2015). However, recognition rates differ widely between Member States. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
7 Asylum decisions can be distinguished according to the stage of the procedure when they are taken. 
According to Eurostat, the EU defines first instance decision as a decision granted by the respective 
authority acting as a first instance of the administrative/judicial asylum procedure in the receiving 
country. If an asylum seeker is rejected at first instance, he or she can lodge an appeal. The next step in 
the asylum procedure, the final decision on appeal, means that all normal routes of appeal in a country 
have been exhausted. This varies between Member States according to national legislation and 
administrative procedures (Eurostat 2014). 
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Germany took 97,275 first instance decisions in 2014, of which 58 percent were rejections, 34 
percent were refugee status, and 8 percent were other protection statuses. Of its 25,870 first 
instance decisions in 2014, the UK rejected 61 percent, while 35 percent of first-time applicants 
were granted refugee status and 4 percent were granted protection for humanitarian reasons. In 
sharp contrast, Sweden only issued rejections in 23 percent of its total 39,905 first instance 
decisions. It granted refugee status to only 26 percent of first-time applicants, but granted 
subsidiary protection to 48 percent of first-time applicants and protection for humanitarian 
reasons to the remaining 3 percent. Germany granted subsidiary protection to 6 percent of first-
time applicants and the UK granted no one subsidiary protection (Bitoulas 2015).  
The vast majority of asylum seekers in the EU in 2014 came from Syria (122,790 
applicants), followed far behind by Afghanistan (41,305), Kosovo (37,875), Eritrea (36,990), and 
Serbia (30,810). However, the distribution of asylum applicants from certain countries varies 
considerably depending upon the Member State. For example, 33 percent of Syrian asylum 
applicants applied in Germany in 2014, followed by 25 percent in Sweden. The next highest 
concentration of Syrian applicants was in the Netherlands, with 8 percent. In addition, 
recognition rates vary significantly between applicants of different national origins. In the EU-
28 as a whole, 5 percent of Syrian applicants were rejected, yet 51 percent were granted refugee 
status and 43 percent were granted subsidiary protection. Thirty seven percent of Afghan 
applicants were rejected, and a full 98 percent of Serbians were rejected (Bitoulas 2015). The 
significant differences between Member States’ recognition rates is one of the primary reasons 
that the CEAS is often criticized, because asylum systems are clearly not harmonized across EU 
Member States (Gardella 2013).  
Germany, Sweden, and the UK also differ substantially in terms of welfare state regime. 
Germany, with its work-related social insurance scheme, corporatist structures, and policies that 
affirm traditional societal values, embodies the properties of the Christian democratic regime. 
Its Bismarckian social insurance scheme, financed by employer and employee contributions, 
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safeguards the standard of living of insured workers and their families; it places high value on 
work performance, incorporates stiff work tests, and distributes benefits according to 
contributions. In addition, several features of the German welfare system tend to preserve class 
and status differentials, such as separate insurance funds for workers, white-collar employees, 
and civil servants. Status differentials between classes are perpetuated by the principle of 
suitable employment, which guarantees insured persons the right to refuse a job with lower pay 
or below their qualifications. Furthermore, earnings- related benefits (combined with no or 
marginal taxation of benefits) lead to higher benefit income for salaried employees compared 
with wage workers. The principle of subsidiarity, a centerpiece of Catholic social thought which 
holds that the state should only intervene when the family or civil society are unable to provide 
welfare, is particularly prevalent in Germany, where it is enshrined in the constitution and 
major social legislation. Families, local communities, and voluntary organizations wield the 
primary responsibility for providing social services, while the German state serves as the 
guarantor that these providers fulfill their tasks. Historically, six welfare associations (mainly 
denominational and working-class based) have provided services, and non-profit organizations 
provide between 65 and 70 percent of services directed to children and the elderly (Sainsbury 
2012, 54-55).  
Sweden, with its universal social insurance scheme heavily reliant on taxation and with 
entitlements based on citizenship and residence, is the prime example of the social democratic 
welfare state type. The universalistic social model in Sweden has entailed the expansion of 
public services to the entire population (in particular, healthcare, education, employment 
services, and childcare), and until the 1990s, the private sector played a negligible role in 
providing those services. In the 1950s Sweden introduced work-related benefits to protect 
against the loss of earnings. Instead of replacing flat-rate benefits, the combination of citizen 
benefits and earning-related benefits means that benefits are available to individuals in the 
workforce and outside the labor market. Citizen benefits provide basic security to everyone and 
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earnings-related benefits provide income security to employees, whose numbers have increased 
since Sweden began implementing active labor market policies in the 1950s. Active labor market 
measures remain a crucial characteristic of the Swedish welfare system, with the ultimate goal of 
full employment and the right to work for everyone. Finally, Sweden’s social democratic welfare 
state emphasizes egalitarian outcomes and redistributive policies; although income inequality in 
Sweden has increased since the 1980s, it remains significantly less prominent than in liberal and 
Christian democratic welfare regime countries (Sainsbury 2012, 83-84).  
The UK, with its heavy reliance on means-tested benefits and market solutions, 
embodies the key characteristics of a liberal welfare state regime. Compared with the United 
States, which is often considered the prototype of the liberal welfare state, the British welfare 
state provides a much broader range of public benefits, including medical care, family and 
maternity benefits, and housing and personal services. However, the UK still clearly classifies as 
a liberal regime because of its modest social insurance benefits, the prominence of means-tested 
benefits based on a bare minimum, and the importance of private welfare benefits and market 
solutions. The UK’s postwar welfare state was designed to provide minimum benefits; however, 
the combination of flat-rate benefits and low benefit levels increased reliance on means-tested 
benefits and supplementary protection through the market. In the UK (and the US) a poverty 
test for means-tested benefits restricts access to the needy and benefit levels are quite low. The 
UK and the US have relatively high poverty rates, especially children’s poverty (Sainsbury 2012).  
While the UK’s private welfare component has been much less prominent compared with 
the US, it ranked second to the US in the proportion of GDP comprising private welfare 
spending. Indeed, since the 1970s private occupational pensions have increased from 55 
percent, reaching 70 percent of total pension income in the mid-1990s. At the same time the 
value of public pensions has declined, increasing income inequalities among pensioners. 
However, the middle class, which generally has access to private pensions, has received more 
generous benefits. Since the 1990s, another aspect reinforcing the UK’s liberal welfare state has 
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been the growing importance of tax benefits (a pro-market solution). Since 1997, the British 
government has moved to replace means-tested allowances with income-tested tax benefits to 
top up earnings for groups with low pay or “in work benefits” to supplement wages. Essentially, 
the tax credit system focuses on wage supplements rather than on insurance benefits that aim at 
wage replacement. Tax credits have become an essential part of the UK income transfer system, 
and the design of these tax credits has extended means-tested benefits to a larger proportion of 
the population (Sainsbury 2012, 36-37).   
 
Major Sources of Country-Specific Information 
Fortunately for the scope of this thesis, publicly available EU and national sources 
provide detailed accounts of reception conditions for asylum seekers and access to social 
benefits for asylum seekers, refugees, and third-country nationals. The European Migration 
Network (EMN) offers a wealth of current and consistent reporting about asylum and migration 
topics in the EU and its Member States. The EMN was formally established by the European 
Council in 2008 with the goal to meet the information needs of European Community 
institutions and of Member States’ authorities and institutions on migration and asylum by 
providing “up-to-date, objective, reliable and comparable information on migration and asylum 
topics” to policy makers at the EU and Member State levels and to the general public (Council of 
the European Union 2008). In collaboration with “National Contact Points” in each Member 
State, the EMN publishes a variety of reports and studies, ad-hoc queries, policy briefs, 
bulletins, and policy factsheets, all of which are publicly available on its website. The EMN’s 
output each year is determined by EMN Work Programs developed by the European 
Commission. The EMN’s annual Status Report details its progress in implementing the 
Commission’s Work Program, but it also publishes country fact sheets describing political and 
legislative developments in migration and international protection in each Member State, based 
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on Annual Policy Reports produced each year by each EMN National Contact Point. The EMN 
also collects and analyzes migration and asylum statistics annually.  
Another valuable source of EU and Member State asylum and migration information is 
the Asylum Information Database (AIDA), a project of the European Council on Refugees and 
Exiles (ECRE), in partnership with Forum Refugiés-Cosi, the Hungarian Helsinki Committee 
and the Irish Refugee Council. Similar to the EMN, the AIDA project provides independent and 
up-to-date information to the media, researchers, advocates, legal practitioners, and the public 
about asylum practices in Europe, focusing especially on asylum procedures, reception 
conditions, and detention. Overall, the project aims to improve asylum policies and practices in 
Europe and the situation of asylum seekers by providing all involved actors with the appropriate 
tools and information to support their advocacy and litigation efforts, both at the national and 
European levels. Fourteen country reports (from Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Germany, France, 
Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Sweden, and the UK) were 
written in the first stage of the AIDA project, from September 2012 to December 2013, and in 
the second phase of the project, from January 2014 to December 2015, the database will expand 
to include two additional EU Member States (Cyprus and Croatia) as well as two non-EU 
neighboring countries (Switzerland and Turkey). AIDA regularly updates its comparative 
indicators (the first update was published in spring 2014) and relevant news and advocacy 
resources. 
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CHAPTER IV: ANALYSIS OF NATIONAL CASE STUDIES 
This chapter examines the social rights of asylum seekers, admitted refugees, and non-
EU legal immigrants in each national case. First, it looks at the reception conditions and social 
rights of asylum seekers (including access to housing, healthcare, education, and the labor 
market, as well as social benefits and transfers) and how these have changed, or not, since the 
final rounds of implementation of the CEAS. Second, it compares the social rights of admitted 
refugees and non-EU legal immigrants in the same areas.  
The UK, Germany, and Sweden were selected as case studies because each has a high 
number of asylum seekers and each exemplifies a different welfare regime type. The 
fundamental analytical assumption here is that welfare state type affects immigrants’ social 
rights. However, social policy alone cannot explain away all outcomes for immigrants’ social 
rights; to complete the picture, it is also necessary to analyze the impact of each country’s 
incorporation regime and the impact of entry categories. For example, as a general rule, 
admitted refugees are granted access to the same social rights as citizens in all three countries; 
however, because of core differences in the countries’ welfare regimes, the social rights of 
admitted refugees (and citizens) still differ considerably between the UK, Germany, and 
Sweden.  
The countries’ incorporation regimes – how inclusive or restrictive they are for 
newcomers – also have clear consequences for immigrants’ social rights. For instance, Germany 
and Sweden both grant asylum-seeking children and children of asylum seekers access to 
education on the same level as citizen children. Sweden, with its inclusive incorporation regime, 
has introduced cultural and political rights for immigrants and included immigrant languages in 
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school curricula, so asylum-seeking children have the right to receive an education in their 
mother tongue. Under Germany’s restrictive incorporation regime, however, many Länder do 
not have special language courses to accommodate asylum-seeking children, who tend to 
struggle in the German education system as a result. Moreover, in Sweden, a simplified permit 
system grants a residence permit almost immediately to anyone expected to stay in the country 
for over a year, and residence is the main entry point to accessing non-work-related benefits. In 
Germany and the UK, however, foreigners can only obtain permits if they prove they can 
support themselves with no “recourse to public funds.” These are just some examples of the 
ways in which different immigrant incorporation regimes lead to different outcomes for 
immigrants’ rights across the three countries studied here.   
It is also essential to analyze the impact of the forms or immigration or “entry categories” 
on immigrants’ social rights. In all three countries, asylum seekers’ benefits are organized under 
entirely separate welfare schemes from those of the general population. In the UK, their benefit 
levels are far below the standard social minimum, in Germany they were far below until very 
recently, and in Sweden asylum seekers’ benefits have not been adjusted since 1994. At the 
opposite end of the spectrum, admitted refugees are granted access to the same social rights as 
citizens. Similarly, highly skilled migrants are fast-tracked for residence permits and have 
instant access to all benefits in the UK and Germany. Sweden does not grant permits differently 
for highly skilled migrants and has not limited labor migration to only professionals.  
However, it is important to note that national immigration policies are not created in a 
vacuum; the party in government can have a significant impact on a country’s immigration 
regime if that party favors inclusive over restrictive policies, or vice versa. Various scholars have 
explored how the existence or growth of far-right parties can affect mainstream parties’ electoral 
competition and stances on immigration policy (Mudde 2012; Green-Pedersen and Odmalm 
2008; Howard 2010; Schain 2006). Others have investigated the role of external shocks and 
public opinion shifts in explaining policy changes (Luedtke 2005; Fenger, van der Steen, and 
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van der Torre 2014), as well as general shifts in party alignment and contestation (Hooghe, 
Marks, and Wilson 2002; Kitschelt and Rehm 2012; Pardos-Prado et al. 2014). An in-depth 
discussion of these topics with regard to the three countries studied here is beyond the scope of 
this thesis, but a cursory analysis shows that the party in government has made a difference in 
immigration and asylum policies in these case studies. The governing party has made the most 
difference in the UK, where almost all of the most restrictive immigration and asylum legislation 
has been passed by Conservative governments. In Germany and Sweden, the relationship 
between immigration and asylum policy party is less clear-cut but some trends are discernible.  
Finally, as could be expected, the EU’s influence in asylum support and in social rights 
for refugees and third-country nationals differs greatly between the three countries. It is clearly 
stronger in Germany and Sweden than in the UK, which has not opted into most of the EU 
legislation dealing with welfare provision for asylum seekers and third-country nationals. In 
Germany, implementation of EU Directives appears to have improved reception conditions for 
asylum seekers, yet in Sweden, adherence to EU standards has actually led to slightly more 
differentiation among entry categories and more restrictions for immigrants’ access to benefits.  
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THE UNITED KINGDOM 
 
Overview 
The UK’s liberal welfare regime and restrictive immigration regime combine to create an 
environment that is generally unwelcoming for newcomers. Entry categories also have a large 
impact on immigrants’ social rights: asylum seekers and third-country nationals face many 
more restrictions to their access to social benefits compared with admitted refugees, who 
immediately gain access to the same benefits as UK citizens. Asylum seekers’ benefits are 
organized in an entirely separate scheme to the general population, benefit levels are very low – 
often below the poverty line – and means-tested benefits prevail. Essentially, asylum seekers 
only obtain (minimal) assistance if they are destitute. Retrenchment measures have reduced 
benefits for third-country nationals and some restrictions have been specifically designed to 
deter immigrants from entering the UK, despite the fact that the UK’s welfare system is based, 
on principle, on universalism.  
Broadly speaking, the party in power – whether Conservative or Labour – has had a 
noticeable impact on the general character of Britain’s immigration policies. Conservative 
governments tend to favor more restrictive measures in all areas of immigration policy, although 
both parties have implemented restrictive asylum policies. Somerville (2007) argues that the 
UK’s lack of constitutional checks and balances on the political executive allows the executive to 
override the legal system more easily than in other countries, which consequently allows it to 
pass legislation that excludes immigrants more easily.  
In the post-war period, the Labour Party embarked on an immigration policy founded 
upon two central pillars: limitation and integration (Somerville, Sriskandarajah, and Latorre 
2009). The 1971 Immigration Act repealed most previous legislation on immigration, laying the 
foundation of the UK’s current legal framework for immigration. Founded upon the goal of “zero 
net immigration,” the 1971 Act included strong control procedur
	  	  
34 
	  
distinctions between the rights of the UK-born / UK passport-holders and people from former 
British colonies. Overseas citizens from the colonies and Commonwealth became subject to 
immigration controls and lost their privileges with respect to entry, residence, and employment. 
The second pillar, integration, mainly took the form of antidiscrimination laws: in a limited 
form in the 1965 Race Relations Act, in an expanded form in the 1968 Race Relations Act, and in 
a more comprehensive form in the 1976 Race Relations Act (Somerville, Sriskandarajah, and 
Latorre 2009).  
The Conservative government that ruled from 1979 to 1997 followed the same general 
policy path, although with a much stronger emphasis on limiting and restricting immigration. In 
fact, broadly speaking, since the 1970s the most restrictive of the UK’s immigration policies have 
been passed by Conservative governments. The prime example of this is the British Nationality 
Act of 1981, which ended centuries of common-law tradition by removing the automatic right of 
citizenship to all those born on British soil, altering pure application of the ius soli tradition 
(Sainsbury 2012; Somerville, Sriskandarajah, and Latorre 2009). Under Margaret Thatcher’s 
Conservative government, British citizenship, which previously included all colonials, was 
tightened and replaced with British citizenship limited primarily to the UK (Sainsbury 2012). 
Since the late 1980s, when humanitarian flows to the UK and other European countries 
significantly increased (following the fall of the Berlin Wall, the breakup of the Soviet Union, 
and escalating conflicts in the former Yugoslavia in the early 1990s), the focus of UK 
immigration policy has been on regulating the flow of asylum seekers and restricting their 
benefits (Somerville, Sriskandarajah, and Latorre 2009). 
Two major pieces of Conservative legislation marked this change.  The first, the 1993 
Asylum and Immigration Appeals Act passed under John Major’s Conservative government, 
created new "fast-track" procedures for asylum applications, allowing detention of asylum 
seekers while their claim was being decided and reducing asylum seekers' benefit entitlements. 
The second major piece of legislation, the 1996 Immigration and Asylum Act, continued in the 
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same restrictive vein with new measures designed to reduce asylum claims, including further 
welfare restrictions (Kankulu et al. 2013; Somerville, Sriskandarajah, and Latorre 2009).  
During the Labour Party’s 13 years in office from 1997 to 2010, no fewer than 10 
parliamentary acts on immigration and asylum, along with several major reforms to the 
immigration system were passed. Labour pursued an expansive, “managed migration strategy” 
with regard to labor migration, introducing a system of selective admission driven by employer 
demand. This marked “a decisive break with the previous policy model” under the Conservative 
government (Somerville 2007, 29). Unlike the control-focused rhetoric of the past, Labour 
highlighted the positive economic benefits of selective immigration amidst a time of 
unprecedented economic growth. Partly as a consequence of its expansive labor migration 
policies, the UK has gained two and a half million foreign-born workers since 1997 (Somerville, 
Sriskandarajah, and Latorre 2009), thus is it no exaggeration to say that immigration under 
Labour quite literally “changed the face” of Britain (Finch and Goodhart 2010, 4).  
However, in other areas of immigration policy, including asylum, Labour largely stuck to 
the path forged by the Conservatives. Overall, Labour increased restrictions on those seeking 
asylum, added more control measures for unauthorized immigrants, including expanded 
security measures, and reoriented the official position on “integration” (Somerville 2007, 65). In 
asylum policy, even though it did not introduce restrictions on welfare for asylum seekers, 
Labour “assiduously followed the course set by the previous Conservative government.” For 
example, the 2002 Nationality, Immigration, and Asylum Act included a “concerted (and 
effective) set of policy measures to reduce support for asylum seekers” and includes “infamous” 
measures such as withdrawing support to “late” asylum applicants and also ensures that support 
is withdrawn from rejected asylum applicants, which has contributed to widespread destitution, 
as will be discussed later in this chapter. In 2002, the Labour government also revoked asylum 
seekers’ right to work and excluded asylum seekers from non-emergency healthcare (Somerville 
2007).  
	  	  
36 
	  
Thus, since the late 1990s, the UK’s legislative measures in asylum have been designed 
first to prevent asylum seekers’ arrival or ensure their speedy departure, and if that fails, to 
make those already in the UK more uncomfortable by restricting their access to welfare, their 
place of residence, and their freedom to settle in a place of their choosing (if they receive state 
accommodation or other support) (Gibney 2011). Legal migration has been confronted with 
similar trends. Since the 2008 introduction of the Points-Based System, “the emphasis has been 
on reducing net migration and abuse of the immigration system” (Kankulu et al. 2013, 7). David 
Cameron’s Conservative government, in power since 2010, has accelerated the trend toward 
more restrictive immigration measures. Since October 2013, the Conservative government has 
tightened naturalization requirements, in particular by adding language and knowledge tests 
about life in the UK, purportedly to facilitate immigrants’ integration. Individuals who want to 
live permanently in the UK or naturalize as British citizens are now required to have speaking 
and listening skills at B1 on the Common European Framework and pass the “Life in the UK” 
test (Kankulu et al. 2013). These new requirements have moved the UK toward a more 
restrictive naturalization regime, after the Conservatives already modified the application of ius 
soli in British nationality in 1981.  
A tough line on immigration is traditionally one of the Conservative Party’s “strongest 
cards” (Parker 2007), yet now more than ever the Conservatives have electoral incentives to 
continue to take a tough stance. While negative views of immigration have been common in the 
UK since the 1960s, public opinion toward immigration has hardened since 2000, and 
immigration now consistently ranks among the top four issues of concern to British citizens 
(Blinder 2014). Reacting to public opposition to immigration, Cameron pledged in 2010 to 
reduce overall net migration levels from the hundreds of thousands to tens of thousands by the 
end of the 2010 - 2015 parliament and to introduce additional criteria and restrictions for entry. 
For example, the Immigration Act of 2014 made it easier to remove people refused permission 
to stay in the UK (by reducing the scope to appeal and simplifying the removal process) and 
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created a more “hostile environment” for people living in the UK without a valid immigration 
status. The current government has also restricted new immigrants’ entitlements to certain 
welfare benefits, in an attempt to minimize some of the perceived “pull factors” for European 
immigration (Gower 2015b).  
The EU’s influence in migration and asylum policy in the UK is far more limited than in 
Germany and Sweden, because the UK decided not to opt-in to the border and visa elements of 
the Schengen acquis. It also participates in very few EU legal migration measures that establish 
common rules and benefits for third-country nationals. In asylum the UK is bound by the first 
round of CEAS measures but has not opted into the second round versions of the Reception 
Conditions Directive, the Asylum Procedures Directive, or the Qualification Directive. In 2005 
when the UK implemented the original version of the Reception Conditions Directive, it did 
make changes to domestic legislation, although these changes were largely restrictive in nature. 
For example, the UK amended its 2000 Asylum Support Regulations to specify when asylum 
support may be suspended or discontinued. Each recipient of asylum support must sign an 
Asylum Support Agreement when provided with that support, and if the applicant or their 
dependents breach the conditions of the agreement, the government may withdraw support and 
accommodation (Gittins and Broomfield 2013). The older version of the Reception Conditions 
Directive – the one the UK has legally adopted – was amended because of inadequate levels of 
material reception conditions across EU Member States. The recast version aims to ensure a 
“dignified standard of living” (European Parliament and Council of the European Union 2013) 
and common standards across Member States. As the following section will show, material 
support for asylum seekers in the UK is often far below the poverty level. 
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Reception Conditions and Benefits for Asylum Seekers 
	  
Framework and Responsibility 
The core elements of asylum support in the UK reflect fundamental aspects of the liberal 
welfare regime as a whole: the prominence of means-tested benefits and private provision of 
social services. Asylum seekers are not eligible for mainstream welfare benefits while they wait 
for a decision on their asylum application. Instead, if they are destitute, they can apply to UK 
Visas and Immigration (UKVI, a Home Office directorate)8 for accommodation and/or financial 
support, so-called “asylum support” (Gower 2015a). Prior to the Asylum and Immigration Act of 
1996, adult asylum seekers and those recognized as refugees under the 1951 Convention had 
been supported by the same social security benefits as British citizens. However, the 1996 Act, 
which was specifically designed to reduce asylum seekers’ universal access to state provision of 
benefits and housing, removed asylum seekers’ entitlement to social security support if they 
claimed asylum after arrival (in-country applicants), rather than on entering the UK (port 
applicants).9 Then, the 1999 Immigration and Asylum Act created a separate support system for 
asylum seekers, using vouchers that provided 70 percent of standard minimum benefits. These 
were soon replaced with reception centers with support in kind and a small amount of pocket 
money (Gower 2013; Sainsbury 2012). At present, the separate and much lower benefit rates for 
asylum seekers fall below the poverty line (The Children’s Society 2014). Responsibility for 
asylum seekers’ welfare is shared between the Home Office, which holds overall responsibility 
for the reception of destitute asylum seekers, and local authorities, which support 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
8 UK Visas and Immigration manages applications for people who want to visit, work, study, or settle in 
the UK. Previously, these applications were managed by the UK Border Agency (UKBA), but the UKBA 
was replaced in April 2013 with two separate units that both function under the umbrella of the Home 
Office: UKVI and an immigration law enforcement division (Travis 2013).  
9 The British government based its decision to remove benefits for “in-country” applicants on the 
“unproven assumption that port applicants were more likely to have a genuine claim for asylum than in-
country applicants” (Gardner 2006, 8).  
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unaccompanied asylum-seeking children and asylum seekers with additional needs beyond 
destitution, such as illness and/or disability (Gittins and Broomfield 2013).  
 
Accommodation 
Asylum seekers are initially housed in one of six initial accommodation centers around 
the country while they await their application decisions. These facilities provide full board, but 
no cash allowances.10 Asylum seekers may spend around two to three weeks in initial 
accommodation centers, during which time UKVI considers their application for financial 
support if they are unable to support themselves. If UKVI grants an asylum seeker housing, he 
or she has no choice about where to live. Because of limited housing in London and South East 
England, the Home Office disperses asylum seekers throughout the country based on availability 
of suitable accommodation, the “cultural fit of asylum seekers, capacity of support services, local 
housing strategies and risk of increasing social tension” (Gittins and Broomfield 2013, 15). 
The UK contracts out the provision of asylum seekers’ accommodation to private 
companies, local authorities or housing associations, or a mix of the two. In March 2012 the 
Home Office awarded new accommodation and transport contracts for asylum support services, 
also known as commercial and operational managers procuring asylum support services 
(COMPASS) contracts. COMPASS contracts require housing providers to respond to changing 
demand, sourcing and providing additional properties as necessary. According to an EMN 
country report, this “enables demand-led flexibility in the provision of accommodation, allowing 
the UK to respond to the volume of need as this varies. Under the COMPASS contracts the same 
provider has control over the supply chain and can therefore regulate the supply of sufficient 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
10 The 1999 Immigration and Asylum Act introduced non-cash vouchers to provide asylum seekers with 
“support in kind,” removing the assumed incentive for potential economic migrants. Despite the fact that 
a cash-based support system would be easier to deliver and generally cheaper in terms of unit cost, the 
Home Office concluded that non-cash vouchers would provide “less of a financial inducement for those 
who would be drawn by a cash scheme” (Gardner 2006, 18).  
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accommodation.” As of December 31, 2012 there were 17,594 individuals in long-term dispersal 
accommodation and 8,500 accommodation units were in use (Gittins and Broomfield 2013, 3). 
 
Allowances 
Support for asylum seekers in the UK is minimal and provided on a purely means-tested 
basis. The UK’s asylum support legislation in the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1999 
allows asylum seekers who are destitute or are about to become destitute within a 14-day period 
to apply for support in the form of accommodation and/or a cash allowance to cover their 
essential living needs. Asylum seekers must prove that they are destitute, which is a process 
strictly enforced by UKVI. 11 UKVI takes into account all assets in the UK or elsewhere, including 
cash, savings, investments, land, cars or other vehicles, and goods held for the purpose of a trade 
or other business. An asylum seeker must exhaust all assets before he or she is eligible for 
asylum support or accommodation; once UKVI determines an individual is destitute, there is no 
requirement for contributions from him or her (Gittins and Broomfield 2013; Asylum Aid 2015). 
While UKVI assesses asylum seekers’ eligibility for support, they can receive temporary financial 
support (section 98 support), but once deemed destitute, asylum seekers receive what is 
commonly known as section 95 support and which includes accommodation and cash vouchers. 
An asylum seeker will continue to receive section 95 support until 28 days after he or she is 
granted leave to remain (a positive application decision). Once an asylum claim is refused and 
appeal rights exhausted, section 95 support ends, except for families with children (Asylum Aid 
2015).12 Successful applicants are granted leave to remain in the UK and become eligible to work 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
11 A person is considered destitute if he or she: does not have adequate accommodation or any means of 
obtaining it; does have adequate accommodation; has no means of fulfilling other essential needs; or, will 
be in this position within 14 calendar days (Asylum Aid 2015, 53).  
12 If an asylum application is rejected, section 95 will last until 21 days after a non-appealable decision or 
after the time limit to appeal the most recent decision expires (commonly called Appeal Rights 
Exhausted) (Asylum Aid 2015, 53). 
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and access mainstream welfare benefits. Failed asylum seekers, whose section 95 support 
terminates, are left with few options. Some may be eligible for section 4 support, which provides 
accommodation and non-cash benefits13 (below the already-low support levels for asylum 
seekers) and lasts until they leave the UK (Gittins and Broomfield 2013).  
The Home Office has received considerable criticism from NGOs in the UK for its very 
low levels of cash benefits (The Children’s Society 2014). From 2008 to 2011, asylum support 
rates rose with inflation, but from April 2011, the Home Office did not increase monthly asylum 
support levels. As of December 2012, when AIDA conducted its original study of the UK’s 
asylum system, the amount of section 95 financial allowance/vouchers granted to asylum 
seekers per month was 189 euros for a single adult, 374 euros for a couple living together, 226.5 
euros for a single parent, and 273 euros for a child under the age of 16. Section 4 support for 
refused asylum seekers was 182.5 euros per person (Asylum Aid 2015, 56).  
In a case brought against the Home Secretary by the charity Refugee Action, the High 
Court ruled that the Home Secretary had acted unlawfully in freezing asylum support rates and 
had failed to gather information needed to assess whether support levels were sufficient to meet 
asylum seekers’ essential living needs. The High Court also reviewed the decision in light of the 
EU Reception Conditions Directive, which requires the provision of “material reception 
conditions to ensure a standard of living adequate for the health of applicants and capable of 
ensuring their subsistence,” but ultimately the Court adopted its conclusions only on the basis of 
domestic law. The Court gave the government until August 2014 to re-assess asylum support 
rates, but the Home Office subsequently announced that the support rates were adequate and 
would remain unchanged (Gower 2015a; Gower 2015b; ECRE 2014a; ECRE 2014b).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
13 Section 4 support, which unlike section 95 support cannot be provided in cash, is available only if 
“refused asylum seekers can show either that they are not fit to travel, that they have a pending judicial 
review, that there is no safe and viable route of return, that they are taking all reasonable steps to return 
to their home country, or that it would be a breach of their human rights not to give this support” (Asylum 
Aid 2015, 55).  
	  	  
42 
	  
Since the Home Office’s announcement, the British Parliament passed an amendment to 
the Immigration and Asylum Act of 1999 on March 12, 2015 that will introduce a flat rate of 
support per person. The previous support rates varied per person depending on the person’s age 
and household composition, as shown above, but the new amendment, titled Asylum Support 
Regulations 2015, which will go into effect on April 6, 2015, will give each person 50 euros per 
week, or approximately 250 euros per month. The changes were made because a Home Office 
review concluded that the rate dating from 2011 for a single person was too low, but the rates for 
asylum seekers with dependents did not “take into account economies of scale” and exceeded 
what they needed to cover essential living needs (Gower 2015b). Families with children will be 
particularly affected by the simplified support structure, as children under 16 will now receive 
almost 100 euros less per month than they did under the previous differentiated rates (Gower 
2015b).  
For all refused asylum seekers who cannot fulfill the conditions for section 4 support 
(quite a long list), the government provides no support to refused asylum seekers (with the 
exception of families who can retain section 95 support). If, for whatever reason, they cannot to 
return to their country of origin, these asylum seekers are left destitute and homeless. While the 
numbers of refused asylum seekers who are totally destitute in the UK is unknown, a 2005 study 
estimated it to be 283,500. In Greater Manchester alone, NGOs are supporting about 2,000 
destitute refused asylum seekers (Asylum Aid 2015, 55). 
 
Healthcare 
Healthcare in the UK is devolved, so each country (England, Northern Ireland, Scotland, 
and Wales) has its own system of publicly funded healthcare; together, these four systems 
comprise the National Health Service (NHS). While a variety of differences exist between the 
systems, the most important commonalities are that each country provides all permanent 
residents of the UK with free healthcare at the point of need and the systems are financed 
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through general taxation. Because of the decentralized nature of healthcare in the UK, asylum 
seekers’ access varies depending on the country (NHS 2015a).  
For instance, in England asylum seekers awaiting a decision, refused asylum seekers 
receiving section 95 or section 4 support, and unaccompanied asylum-seeking children all have 
access to free hospital treatment. Asylum seekers awaiting a decision are allowed to register with 
a general doctor. For refused asylum seekers not on section 95 or section 4 support, hospital 
doctors are not supposed to refuse urgent treatment, but the hospital must charge them for it 
(although it has the discretion to write off the charges). Accident and emergency services (but 
not follow-up, in-patient care) and treatment for certain listed diseases are free to everyone, 
including refused asylum seekers not on asylum support (Asylum Aid 2015, 64-65). General 
doctors are given discretion to register refused and unsupported asylum seekers in the same way 
that they would for any UK resident living in their catchment area (NHS 2015b). However, 
asylum seekers are not guaranteed access to mental health services, and specialized treatment 
for torture victims or traumatized asylum seekers is available in very short supply. Several 
independent charities and smaller NGOs also provide specialized treatment, but in all cases 
language and cultural barriers tend to block appropriate referrals from healthcare workers who 
have initial contact with asylum seekers and also impede asylum seekers’ awareness of what 
services are available (Asylum Aid 2015, 64-65).  
In Scotland all asylum seekers can access full free healthcare, as can their 
spouses/partners and any dependent children and refused asylum seekers not on section 4 
support. Wales recently introduced regulations that charged refused asylum seekers for 
healthcare but later revoked them. In Northern Ireland, a refused asylum seeker is not entitled 
to free specialist healthcare unless they can show that they are “ordinarily or lawfully resident.” 
Regardless of their specific rules determining asylum seekers’ access to healthcare, in practice 
asylum seekers across all healthcare systems in the UK receive inadequate levels of support. 
Britain’s 2014 Immigration Act grants healthcare providers the power to charge migrants for 
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healthcare, and the charging regime tends to block or discourage their access to healthcare in 
general (Asylum Aid 2015).  
 
Education 
Education in the UK is compulsory for all children aged five to sixteen, including asylum-
seeking children and children of asylum seekers, who attend mainstream schools under the 
same conditions, in principle, as other children in their area. In practice, economic hardship 
may affect their access to education. For example, children on section 4 support cannot receive 
free school meals or other benefits but have no cash to pay for school meals. Moreover, the UK 
usually does not offer preparatory classes to facilitate asylum seekers’ integration into the school 
system. While there is no explicit legal barrier to asylum seekers entering higher or further 
education, they face considerable financial obstacles, as in addition to high fees and their lack of 
access to loans, they cannot access mainstream social benefits or work. Language barriers, 
periods of interrupted education, and incompatible educational qualifications also pose major 
obstacles to their access to further and higher education (Asylum Aid 2014).  
 
Labor Market Access 
The text of the 2003 Reception Conditions Directive, which the UK adheres to, states 
that Member States may determine a period of time, starting from the date on which an asylum 
application is lodged, during which an asylum seeker will not have access to the labor market. If 
a decision on an individual’s application has not been made within a year from the date of 
application, and “this delay cannot be attributed to the applicant, Member States shall decide 
the conditions for granting access to the labour market for the applicant.” Furthermore, for 
“reasons of labour market policies,” Member States can grant EU citizens, nationals from 
European Economic Area countries, and legally resident third-country nationals priority access 
to the labor market (Council of the European Union 2003).  
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The UK has implemented the Directive in perhaps the most restrictive way possible. 
Generally, asylum seekers are denied access to the labor market entirely, but if they have been 
waiting for over a year for a decision, they can apply to the Home Office for permission to work. 
If granted, permission to work lasts until a final decision is made on the asylum application and 
is limited to jobs on the UK’s shortage occupation list. These include specialist trades and 
professions and are generally very specifically defined, such as “consultant in neuro-physiology” 
or “electricity substation electrical engineer” (Gower 2013; Asylum Aid 2015, 65). As a result, an 
asylum seeker’s chance of being qualified is exceedingly low. Asylum seekers cannot be self-
employed and have no access to re-training in order to gain access to the labor market (Asylum 
Aid 2014).  
 
Social Rights for Admitted Refugees  
While most countries grant refugees immediate access to residency and an easier path to 
citizenship than other immigrants, admitted refugees in the UK face additional barriers to 
permanent residency and citizenship. The UK asylum procedure operates within a unified 
system, meaning all applications are first considered for grants of asylum (refugee/Convention 
status), second for humanitarian protection, and third for discretionary leave. 14 The UK does 
not immediately grant refugees permanent residence status (like Sweden does), but it grants 
refugees and individuals with humanitarian protection status leave to enter or remain in the UK 
for a period of five years. Shortly before their leave to remain expires, refugees and those 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
14 Discretionary leave may be granted to people who are “excluded from the benefit of the Geneva 
Convention by virtue of Article 1F, or to those recognised as refugees but who can still be refouled by 
virtue of Article 33 (2), in either case where it would be contrary to European Convention on Human 
Rights obligations to enforce removal to the country of origin.” Discretionary Leave is considered a form 
of “leave to remain” rather than a “protection status,” and is also considered a “non-EU harmonised 
protection status,” which refers to all statuses that fall outside of the “refugee and subsidiary protection 
status” laid out in the EU Qualification Directive. Discretionary leave is granted outside the UK’s 
Immigration Rules, usually for reasons relating to the European Convention of Human Rights (Rice and 
Vadher 2010).   
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granted humanitarian protection must apply for settlement, also called indefinite leave to 
remain (ILR). ILR / residency (settlement) means that the individual has permission to stay 
permanently in the UK (although it can be revoked in certain circumstances, such as a serious 
criminal conviction). For “in time” renewal applications, UKVI only briefly reviews the case; 
“out of time” applications can lead to a full case review to determine whether the individual 
continues to qualify for refugee or humanitarian protection status. Refugees arriving under the 
Gateway Protection Program (GPP), Britain’s quota refugee program,15 are granted immediate 
settlement without any need to apply for ILR (Rice and Vadher 2010).  
Individuals with discretionary leave are usually granted three years leave to remain 
(except for unaccompanied minors who are granted three years, or until they reach the age of 17 
and a half, whichever is shorter). Sometimes, discretionary leave is granted for shorter periods if 
it is “clear that the factors leading to a grant of Discretionary Leave will be short-lived,” such as 
if a person is granted discretionary leave to remain in the UK for a court case (Rice and Vadher 
2010, 11). Individuals with discretionary leave can only apply for ILR when they have received 
grants of discretionary leave adding up to six years (Rice and Vadher 2010).  
If an applicant is granted asylum, humanitarian protection, or discretionary leave, he or 
she has full access to the NHS, public funds (social benefits), social care, education, and the 
labor market – essentially the same social rights as British citizens. As of 2006, individuals with 
refugee and humanitarian protection status are also entitled to family reunion, but those 
granted discretionary leave cannot have family members join them in the UK until they have 
obtained ILR. Family members eligible to enter the UK via family reunification include spouses, 
children (minors), civil partners, same sex, and unmarried partners, all of whom must have 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
15 The UK operates the Gateway Protection Programme (GPP) in partnership with the UNHCR. The GPP 
offers a legal route for a specific number of particularly vulnerable refugees to settle in the UK each year. 
The annual quota is currently 750 (UNHCR 2014b).  
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already been part of the family unit in the country of origin before the individual left to seek 
asylum (Rice and Vadher 2010).  
In early 2010 the UK’s Conservative-led coalition government under Prime Minister 
David Cameron pledged to reform Britain’s immigration system, with the overall goal to reduce 
net immigration flows to the country to below 100,000. Recent figures from Britain’s Office for 
National Statistics show that Cameron has failed spectacularly in this promise – net migration 
for 2014 up to September was 298,000, almost 54,000 higher than when Cameron’s coalition 
government took charge (Whitehead 2015). In pursuit of this goal, the Conservative government 
has implemented several restrictive reforms to the UK’s immigration legislation, which have 
reduced integration assistance for refugees and erected additional barriers to attaining 
permanent residence.  
Between 2008 and 2011, adults (over 18 years of age) who were granted refugee status or 
humanitarian protection status had access to the Refugee Integration and Employment Service 
(RIES),16 which provided 12 months of specialized support to help them integrate into British 
society, and in particular to help them access employment (Rice and Vadher 2010, 11). The RIES 
focused on employment because entering the labor market is a key factor that enables refugees’ 
integration, facilitating their financial independence, verifiable work experience in the UK, 
chances to improve social and work-based English, and the potential for building relationships. 
However, the UK Border Agency (UKBA, the predecessor to UKVI that was abolished in 2013) 
stopped funding the RIES in September 2011. According to the chief executive of the Refugee 
Council, the largest independent refugee charity in the UK, this “means that for the first time in 
living memory there [is] no UK government statutory funding to support refugees to integrate in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
16 The RIES provided new refugees with advice and support to help them meet immediate needs, such as 
housing, education, and access to benefits, and it gave advice on finding long-term work as soon as 
possible. The program also provided each refugee with a mentor to work with on a one-on-one basis, who 
would share knowledge and experience and offer friendship (Rice and Vadher 2010, 11).  
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the UK” (Hill 2011). Also in 2011, the UKBA cut the funding it provided to the Refugee Council 
(which at that time received 78 percent of its funds from the government) by 62 percent. A 
representative from the Home Office acknowledged that “because the UKBA is not facing 
uniform cuts, some areas – including asylum – will be required to bear a greater proportion of 
cuts” (Hill 2011). An additional restrictive development for admitted refugees was the 2009 
reform17 to the UK’s naturalization process. The reform, which would have been put into place in 
July 2011, would have lengthened the period of temporary leave before refugees could attain 
permanent residence and would have introduced a new naturalization process dubbed “earned 
citizenship,” wherein migrants seeking to settle were required to “demonstrate a more visible 
and a more substantial contribution to Britain”18 (Lagnado 2010; Rice and Vadher 2010).  
Ultimately, the coalition government that came to power in 2010 decided not to 
introduce the probationary citizenship and earned citizenship path. However, as of October 
2013 the Conservative government has increased the language requirements for refugees and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
17 The 2009 Act established two major policy goals to pursue with regard to refugees and other migrants: 
managed migration, to “manage the number allowed to settle permanently in the UK,” and integration. 
The 2009 legislation also incorporated refugees into the UK’s existing points-based approach already 
controlling migrant workers’ path to citizenship. 
18 The 2009 Borders, Citizenship, and Immigration Act introduced a longer period of temporary leave 
before refugees could attain permanent residence. Instead of applying directly for full citizenship after five 
years, refugees (and other would-be citizens) faced an additional period of “probationary citizenship.” To 
acquire probationary citizenship under this law, refugees were required to pass an “Active Review” of their 
eligibility, meaning the UK Border Agency had to decide they had a continued need for protection or, in 
the case of dependents and partners, had an ongoing family relationship. Second, they had to pass the 
“Life in the UK” test or equivalent and have no criminal record. Before the 2009 legislation, people with 
refugee status or other leave to remain could apply for full naturalization after passing the “Life in the UK” 
test. Under the law, after one year on probationary citizenship they would be able to apply for full 
citizenship if they met the “activity” condition (participation in civic or voluntary activities), but if not they 
had to wait three years. Criminal convictions would slow down the process and subtract points from full 
citizenship. If a refugee did not want to become a citizen, he or she would be able to apply for permanent 
residence after three years of probationary citizenship (Lagnado 2010).  
Refugee and migrant advocates expressed several serious objections to “earned citizenship” being applied 
to refugees on the grounds that “the safety represented by citizenship should be a right rather than 
something that needs to be ‘earned.’” They argued that a refugee already faces considerable challenges to 
finding safety before their asylum claim is accepted. Once their claim is accepted they need a sense of 
security to rebuild their lives and overcome trauma. Furthermore, the 2009 Act conflicted with the 1951 
Refugee Convention’s requirement to make naturalization as easy a process as possible for refugees 
(Lagnado 2010).  
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other immigrants who are applying for ILR or naturalization. Applicants for both ILR and 
naturalization must demonstrate their knowledge of language and life in the UK and have a 
speaking and listening qualification in English at B1 CEFR or higher, or an equivalent level 
qualification (Home Office 2013). Cameron justified the new focus on English language 
acquisition by saying that immigrants unable to speak English or unwilling to integrate have 
created a "kind of discomfort and disjointedness," which has disrupted communities across 
Britain (Shepherd 2011). Despite increasing language requirements for refugees and other 
immigrants, the government has simultaneously reduced funding for language classes. As of late 
2011, the government only funds basic English classes for immigrants on jobseeker's allowance 
and employability skills allowance, but the classes are no longer free for those claiming income 
support and other benefits (Shepherd 2011; Briggs 2011).  
 
Social Rights for Third-Country Nationals  
Beginning in the 1980s, welfare state restructuring and retrenchment, combined with 
benefit restrictions targeted at third-country nationals, have significantly reduced the social 
rights of newcomers. In general, British welfare state restructuring entailed two major shifts. 
The first, the privatization of several transfer benefits and benefits in kind, generally weakened 
the entitlements of third-country nationals with low earnings and other low income groups. 
They experienced cuts in benefits without always being able to take advantage of the private 
alternative. For example, the increasing privatization of pensions hurts third-country nationals 
and ethnic minorities, who are much less likely to be covered by occupational or personal 
pensions than the white working age population (Sainsbury 2012). The second major aspect of 
restructuring – increased means-testing – has also negatively affected third-country nationals’ 
overall benefit uptake. Immigrants and ethnic minorities tend to have higher poverty rates, but 
also lower take-up rates for means-tested benefits, usually because they are unfamiliar with the 
system and unaware of their eligibility, or because they are unsure how their immigration status 
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will affect their eligibility (Sainsbury 2012, 42). The UK has started checking the immigration 
status of benefit claimants more frequently, so this concern is not unfounded. 
Beyond welfare state restructuring, the UK has recently implemented legislation to 
restrict immigrants’ access to benefits via stricter rules regarding “no recourse to public funds.” 
The principle of no recourse to public funds, more prominent since 1980, specifies the benefits 
that qualify as public funds, which effectively amounts to barring third-country nationals from 
benefits, in direct contradiction with the ideas of universalism. The benefits listed as public 
funds include social housing and housing benefits, the means-tested aspect of the jobseeker’s 
allowance, income-related employment and support allowance, child benefit, child tax credit, a 
social fund payment, council tax benefit, family credit, and several benefits for the disabled and 
care allowances (Home Office 2014; Sainsbury 2012, 43). Tax credits introduced during the 
2000s have also been categorized as public funds. Furthermore, penalties for breaking the no 
recourse to public funds rule have grown more severe, including administrative removal. Thus, 
“a gradual process of disentitlement has transpired initially outside the public eye through 
administrative regulations; it has involved restricting access to an ever broader range of benefits 
and services through linking immigration status and benefit entitlement, and utilization of 
benefits can jeopardize both current and future residence in the United Kingdom” (Sainsbury 
2012, 43). 
Another area where changes have restricted immigrants’ access to benefits is residence 
requirements that lengthen the period before newly arrived immigrants have full and equal 
access to social benefits. The habitual residence rule, initiated in 1994, denies income support, 
housing benefits, and council tax benefit to newcomers who have not yet established residence, 
immigrants with temporary permits, and individuals with breaks in their residence. In addition, 
newcomers cannot gain access to benefits until they gain ILR (settlement status), for which the 
residence requirement ranges from less than a year to four or five years, depending on entry 
category. Moreover, in order to attain ILR immigrants must also pass the Life in the UK test and 
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fulfill English language requirements, as mentioned above. While they await settlement status, 
immigrants cannot access non-contributory benefits or means-tested benefits. The residence 
requirement for a permanent permit for immigrants who do not become citizens has been 
increased to a minimum of eight and a maximum of ten years; thus, the period without access to 
benefits (except for insurance benefits) has grown from a minimum of six years to in some cases 
as long as ten years (Sainsbury 2012, 44). 
In summary, social rights for third-country nationals in the UK have seriously 
diminished since the 1980s. Welfare state restructuring decreased the number of insurance 
benefits and increased the importance of employer-sponsored and means-tested benefits. 
Benefit restrictions aimed at third-country nationals emphasize no recourse to public funds and 
have extended residence requirements. As a result, many third-country nationals have no safety 
net whatsoever during their first years in the UK.  
  
	  	  
52 
	  
GERMANY 
 
Overview 
Certain features of the German welfare regime, particularly its focus on the “standard 
employment relationship” and linking benefits to work and residence, have created vast 
differences between the benefits of asylum seekers and third-country nationals, on one hand, 
and Germans and ethnic Germans (to a lesser extent) on the other. Furthermore, Germany’s 
immigrant incorporation regime sharply distinguishes between Germans and foreigners, and 
entry categories separate individuals further still in terms of social rights and the right to work. 
Asylum seekers’ benefits are organized under a completely separate welfare scheme and, until 
recently, were far below the “standard” social benefits. When the state cannot provide adequate 
accommodation and services for asylum seekers, welfare organizations, especially church 
organizations, step in to fill the gap, as is often the case in Christian democratic welfare states. 
Admitted refugees are immediately granted a temporary residence permit, which grants them 
access to the same social benefits as German citizens and unrestricted access to the labor 
market.  
The situation is more challenging for third-country nationals, however. Rigorous work 
tests and contribution requirements (both fundamental features of Germany’s welfare state) and 
barriers for gaining residence permits (an aspect of Germany’s restrictive incorporation regime) 
combine to limit immigrants’ access to standard social benefits and to the labor market. Labor 
market participation is the primary basis of entitlement, but the right to work varies by entry 
category; newcomers without the right to work have no access to social insurance benefits, the 
foundation of social provision. In addition, if immigrants use social assistance, they harm their 
chances of gaining permanent residence and citizenship (Müller, Mayer, and Bauer 2013; 
Sainsbury 2012). 
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Unlike the UK, which has not opted into the recast versions of the CEAS Directives, 
Germany has recently implemented the new versions, including the Reception Conditions 
Directive and the Qualification Directive. It has also implemented all EU legislation concerning 
the entry, residence, and return of non-EU citizens. However, in practice their implementation 
has had little impact on third-country nationals’ social rights in Germany.  
In the post-war period, Germany exemplified an exclusionary incorporation regime. It 
claimed to not be a country of immigration, yet as a result of its “guest worker” program, which 
began in the 1950s, it had between four and four and a half million foreigners in the country 
throughout the 1980s, largely as a result of family reunification of the guest workers. By 1988, 
Germany had almost five million foreigners (7.3 percent of its total population) (Oezcan 2004). 
Despite growing number of foreigners, German citizenship was still based on ethnicity (ius 
sanguinis). Immigrants of German descent were welcomed (ethnic Germans could claim 
citizenship upon arrival in the country), but immigrants of different ethnic origins faced 
extremely demanding requirements to gain permanent residence and citizenship. Children of 
guest workers born in Germany starting in the 1970s and 1980s (the so-called “second 
generation”) were not granted German citizenship (Sainsbury 2012; Oezcan 2004).  
Germany has a multi-party system that has been dominated since 1949 by the Christian 
Democratic Union (CDU), a Christian democratic, center-right party, and the Social Democratic 
Party (SDP), a social democratic, center-left party. Other major parties include the Greens, the 
far-left Die Linke (Left Party), the center-right Free Democratic Party, and the Christian Social 
Union of Bavaria (CSU). Like CDU, CSU is a Christian democratic conservative party and 
cooperates so frequently with CDU that together they are called the Union, but CSU only fields 
candidates in Bavaria. All of Germany’s post-war federal governments have been coalitions; 
since 1961 these coalitions have been one of four combinations and have always included one or 
sometimes both of the two major parties. Since December 2013, CDU and SPD have governed 
together in a grand coalition.  
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Compared with the UK, where the Conservative Party has historically always passed 
more restrictive immigration policies, the relationship between immigration policy and 
Germany’s governing coalition is less clear. When the center-right CDU is in the governing 
coalition, this does not translate to noticeably more restrictive immigration policies, or vice 
versa for more liberal policies from the center-left SPD. For instance, Germany’s Asylum 
Seekers’ Benefits Act, passed in 1993 under a CDU/CSU and FDP governing coalition, separated 
asylum seekers’ benefits from mainstream benefits and set them at markedly lower levels than 
mainstream benefits. As will be discussed later in the chapter, these levels were not officially 
adjusted until the German Parliament passed an amendment in March 2015.  
The 2002 Immigration Act, which narrowly passed with the backing of the governing 
SPD-Green coalition, included both liberal and restrictive elements. The 2002 Act was later 
overturned by Germany’s Constitutional Court as the result of a voting technicality in the 
Bundesrat, the German Parliament’s upper house,19 but it illustrates that German governing 
coalitions must generally enact compromise legislation in the area of immigration. The Act 
dramatically increased the avenues for labor migration to Germany, adding four different 
channels through which foreigners have the opportunity to enter Germany for work. It also 
simplified the residence permit system and created a fast-track process for highly skilled 
migrants to instantly receive a permanent residence permit (Oezcan 2002). On the restrictive 
end, the 2002 Act made it much more difficult for asylum seekers to gain political asylum, and 
further reduced benefits for those granted asylum. It also introduced stricter integration 
requirements for immigrants (Andrews 2002).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
19 A CDU representative from Brandenburg refused to join the SPD head of his delegation in voting for the 
government's immigration bill. However, despite the CDU representative’s objections, the Bundesrat 
speaker, a member of SPD, decided to count all of Brandenburg's votes as "yes," thus securing a 
controversial one-vote margin for the government's legislation (Hooper 2002). 
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The 2004 Immigration Act, which was actually implemented, represents a compromise 
between Chancellor Gerhard Schröder’s SPD-Green government and the conservative CDU/CSU 
opposition. It contains many of the same elements as the failed 2002 law, including a 
streamlined residence permit system. It maintained restrictive features to regulate foreigners’ 
employment and the fast-track settlement permit for highly skilled immigrants. One important 
expansion of asylum seekers’ rights, however, is that the Law states that unsuccessful asylum 
seekers who cannot be deported to their home countries due to the political situations there can 
now be issued a temporary residence permit. The 2004 Law also extended Germany’s definition 
of a refugee to those persecuted by non-governmental groups and those persecuted based on 
their sexual orientation (Münz 2004). Finally, the 2004 Law acknowledged that Germany was a 
country of immigration, and it has gradually moved from an ethnic toward a civic model of 
citizenship, decreasing some of the obstacles for non-German immigrants and also reducing 
privileges for co-ethnic immigrants (Sainsbury 2012).  
The most recent amendment to the Asylum Seekers’ Benefits Act, passed by the grand 
CDU-SPD coalition in March 2015, increases benefit levels for asylum seekers. In addition, the 
CDU-SPD-led Parliament has decreased the time that asylum seekers must wait before entering 
the labor market and decreased the time they must wait before gaining access to mainstream 
social assistance. Despite these important improvements, and the improvements in the 2004 
Immigration Law, restrictions for immigrants have not been eliminated completely, and new 
restrictions have been added. Overall, Germany remains a restrictive incorporation regime 
(Sainsbury 2012, 55).  
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Reception Conditions and Benefits for Asylum Seekers 
 
Framework and Responsibility  
In the German federal system, the federal government (the Federation) and the Federal 
Länder (Germany’s 16 constituent states) share competences in administering asylum and 
migration policies. The Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF, after the original 
German Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge) carries out asylum procedures, while the 
Länder implement the Asylum Seekers Benefits Act, providing accommodation and payments 
and benefits in kind to cover asylum seekers’ vital needs (Müller, Mayer, and Bauer 2013). The 
German Social Code does not apply to asylum seekers, civil war refugees, or people with 
temporary residence on humanitarian grounds. Instead, these groups and their family members 
are covered by the Asylum Seekers’ Benefits Act (Müller, Mayer, and Bauer 2013). The 
fundamental principle behind the Act is the priority of benefits in kind, or non-cash benefits. 
Länder provide asylum seekers without sufficient income or assets with benefits in kind to cover 
their vital needs, including basic provision of food, accommodation, heating, clothing, 
healthcare and toiletries, household consumer goods and consumables. They also grant asylum 
seekers pocket money for personal daily needs, benefits in the event of illness, pregnancy, and 
birth, and finally, additional benefits in special circumstances, depending on the individual case. 
If an asylum seeker is not being housed in a reception facility (shared accommodation), it is 
possible for him or her to receive cash benefits in some circumstances. Each Federal Länder 
deals with this separately (BAMF 2011; Müller 2013). If asylum seekers have any income or 
capital of their own, they must exhaust those resources before they become eligible for benefits 
under the Asylum Seekers' Benefits Act (Kalkmann 2014).  
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Accommodation 
Asylum seekers are distributed among the Länder via a quota system based on 
population size and tax revenue in order to ensure that the financial costs of their reception are 
shared evenly. There are three types of accommodation for asylum seekers in Germany: initial 
reception centers, collective accommodation centers, and decentralized accommodation 
(Kalkmann 2014). Asylum seekers are required by German federal law to live in a reception 
facility for a period of up to six weeks, but not longer than three months while they undergo 
their asylum application procedure (Müller 2013). Germany has 21 initial reception centers for 
accommodation that are maintained by the Länder; corresponding BAMF branch offices are 
assigned to each reception center to deal with asylum procedures. If the BAMF does not reach a 
decision on an application within three months, applicants are sent to local accommodation 
centers (usually located in the same Länder as the initial reception center) where they have to 
stay for the remainder of their asylum procedures. Even though asylum seekers must stay in 
accommodation centers through the whole length of regular and appeal procedures, there are 
regional differences, and some municipalities also grant asylum seekers access to the regular 
housing market. There are also special facilities for vulnerable groups, such as unaccompanied 
minors, traumatized asylum seekers, and individuals who have suffered sexual violence (Müller 
2013).  
German federal law gives Länder flexibility to organize the accommodation of asylum 
seekers within their territories as they choose. Many Länder delegate responsibility for 
accommodation to municipalities, which then decide whether the centers will be managed by 
the local government itself or by NGOs or facility management companies. Also, in many 
Länder, NGOs, particularly church welfare associations, take on the responsibility of housing 
asylum seekers who are no longer required to live in an initial reception facility (Müller 2013, 
21). Many municipalities are also increasingly using decentralized accommodation (e.g., 
individual houses or apartments) in place of collective accommodation centers, which were 
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inefficient to maintain when numbers of asylum seekers decreased between 2002 and 2007 
(Müller 2013; Kalkmann 2014). However, in 2012 and 2013, asylum applications lodged in 
Germany dramatically increased, largely as a result of massive flows of asylum seekers from 
Syria and other conflict regions.20 By the end of 2014 Germany had more than 200,000 pending 
asylum applications, the highest of any EU Member State. Consequently, Germany’s collective 
and decentralized accommodation centers grew seriously overcrowded, so Länder and 
municipalities turned even more to non-state actors (welfare organizations and some private 
companies) to provide additional accommodation for asylum seekers (Kalkmann 2014).  
 
Allowances 
Like in the UK, reception conditions in Germany and benefit levels for asylum seekers 
have generated controversy in the past few years. Until 2012 benefits for asylum seekers had not 
been adjusted since the Asylum Seekers Benefits Act was adopted in 1993. These benefits were 
markedly lower than social allowances granted to German citizens or to foreigners with a secure 
residence status and were limited to 48 months. For example, a single adult person was entitled 
to about 225 euros per month, but 184 euros of this allowance were categorized as basic needs 
and could be provided in kind. The allowance paid out in cash, purportedly pocket money to 
“cover personal daily requirements” and to provide for asylum seekers’ sociocultural subsistence 
was 40.90 euros per month (20.45 euros for children under 15 years) and sometimes paid out in 
vouchers (Müller 2013, 24; Kalkmann 2014, 54).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
20 According to Eurostat data, in 2012 Germany recorded an increase of 24,000 applicants compared with 
2011, the highest increase of all EU Member States. For EU Member States as a whole, the number of 
Syrian refugees increased by 255 percent between the end of 2011 and the end of 2012. Thirty four percent 
of Syrians applying for asylum in 2012 applied in Germany. Sweden also received 34 percent of Syrian 
applications that year; the next highest percentage was the UK with 6 percent. In addition, Germany 
received a full 72 percent of asylum applicants from the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in 2012. 
In 2013, Germany recorded an increase of 50,000 applicants compared with 2012, or half of the overall 
increase of applicants in the EU in that year. About one out of ten applicants from all source countries 
combined in 2013 lodged their application in Germany; for applicants from non-EU countries only, the 
number grows to one in three (Bitoulas 2013; Bitoulas 2014; Bitoulas 2015). 
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The German Federal Constitutional Court ruled in July 2012 that such low levels of cash 
benefits were incompatible with asylum seekers’ fundamental rights to a minimum existence. 
The court imposed a transitional arrangement, in force until February 2015, which entitled 
asylum seekers to benefits similar to “standard” social benefits, substantially raising cash 
benefits (Müller 2013, 25; Kalkmann 2014; Kalkmann 2015). In November 2014, over two years 
after the Constitutional Court ruling, both houses of the German Parliament finally passed 
revisions to the Asylum Seekers' Benefits Act. According to the amendment, from March 2015 
onwards allowances for asylum seekers will be similar to the ones provided under the 
transitional arrangement. Asylum seekers living in reception or accommodation centers 
generally receive benefits in kind, including food, heating, clothing, and sanitary products, 
therefore their cash benefits are considerably lower than those for asylum seekers living in 
independent apartments. Single adults receive 143 euros per month in accommodation centers 
and 216 euros in independent accommodation; couples living together receive 129 euros in 
accommodation centers and 194 euros outside; and children under six receive 84 euros in 
accommodation centers and 133 euros outside. For asylum seekers outside of reception centers, 
the costs for rent, heating, and household goods have to be provided on top of the minimum 
allowances (Kalkmann 2015). 
 
Healthcare 
The Asylum Seekers’ Benefits Act restricts healthcare for asylum seekers to cases “of 
acute diseases or pain” and only grants more benefits if they are “indispensable” to health. 
Pregnant women and women who have recently given birth are entitled to medical and nursing 
help and support, including midwife assistance. Asylum seekers are also provided with 
vaccinations and “necessary preventive medical check-ups” (Kalkmann 2015, 66). In practice, 
asylum seekers often encounter problems accessing their (minimal) healthcare. First they have 
to obtain a health insurance voucher, which is usually handed out by medical personnel in initial 
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reception centers. However, once asylum seekers have been dispersed to other types of 
accommodation, they usually have to re-apply for vouchers at the social welfare office in their 
municipality. The most recent update to AIDA’s Germany study reports that staff of municipal 
social welfare offices sometimes delay or even deny necessary medical treatment because they 
do not have competences regarding asylum seekers’ healthcare (Kalkmann 2015).  
After 48 months of receiving benefits under the Asylum Seekers’ Benefits Act, asylum 
seekers are entitled to “standard” social benefits under Book XII of the German Social Code, 
which deals with social assistance benefits. For German citizens, this “last safety net” provides 
those who are eligible with a minimum, subsistence income.21 For asylum seekers, this means 
they are able to access healthcare under the same conditions as German citizens who receive 
social assistance. The CDU-SPD grand coalition government recently passed an amendment so 
that beginning on March 1, 2015 the time asylum seekers must wait before gaining access to 
Book XII social assistance will be reduced to 15 months. Finally, traumatized asylum seekers or 
victims of torture are granted access to specialized doctors and therapists; however, space in 
treatment centers is limited, so their access to special therapies is not guaranteed. Länder only 
partially cover the costs of specialized therapies, meaning treatment centers often have to rely 
on donations or other funds to reimburse the costs of interpreters. Moreover, asylum seekers 
often live too far from specialized centers to even access treatment (Kalkmann 2015; Müller 
2013).  
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
21 Given the predominance of employment-based and earnings-related social insurance in the German 
welfare state, social assistance has had a residual role as the last safety net for people with no access to 
insurance or with low benefits. Through social assistance, all German citizens are guaranteed a minimum 
income. Typically, German citizens utilizing Book XII benefits are temporarily unable to work or 
permanently unable to work because of disability or aging (Bahle et al. 2011; Huster et al. 2009).  
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Education 
According to German federal law, all children who reside in Germany have the right and 
obligation to attend school, regardless of their residence status or nationality. However, each 
Länder holds responsibility for the education system within its borders, therefore asylum 
seekers’ access to education differs depending on where they live. Compulsory education ends at 
the age of 16 in several Länder, so children in those states do not have the right to enter schools 
when they are 16 or 17 years old (Kalkmann 2015). In this sense, Germany actually fails to fully 
comply with the EU’s CEAS legislation. The Reception Conditions Directive stipulates that 
Member States cannot withdraw secondary education from asylum-seeking children for the sole 
reason that they have reached the age of majority, but this is the case in some Länder with 
different laws and practices (Langer 2014). Furthermore, while some Länder exemplify “best 
practices” for education of asylum seeking children, many are not adequately prepared to 
address the specialized needs of asylum seeking children; for example, they do not have special 
language and literacy courses for non-German speakers in regular schools or lack other 
measures to integrate asylum-seeking children (Kalkmann 2015, 65).  
 
Labor Market Access 
Until recently, asylum seekers were barred from labor market access for one year. When 
Germany implemented the recast EU Reception Conditions Directive in September 2013, this 
decreased to nine months. In September 2014, the German Parliament amended the Asylum 
Procedures Act, granting asylum seekers and third-country nationals access after three months. 
This change is designed to give asylum applicants an earlier opportunity to financially support 
themselves by starting work. The amendment also lifts residence restrictions on asylum seekers 
after their third month in the country, removing the “residence obligation” that previously 
limited asylum seekers’ movements outside of their municipality of residence and made finding 
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employment even more difficult.22 The “geographic restriction” can be reinstated, however, if an 
asylum seeker is convicted of a crime or if his or her deportation is imminent 
(Informationsverbund Asyl und Migration 2014).  
The September 2014 amendments will also waive “priority review” after 15 months.  For 
a period of 12 months following the asylum seekers' access to the labor market, the job center 
has to carry out a “priority review,” that is, determine whether there is another qualified job-
seeker who has a better status in terms of employment regulations, particularly German citizens, 
EU migrants, or third-country nationals with a secure residence permit. If no one is found, 
asylum seekers can access the position after 15 months (i.e., three months waiting period for 
access to the labor market, plus 12 months). The job center will also conduct a “review of labor 
conditions” to ascertain whether the workplace adheres to regional wage standards and 
workplace standards. The amendments also eliminated the principle of benefits in kind for 
asylum seekers living outside of initial reception centers; instead, they will receive cash benefits 
only (Kalkmann 2014; Informationsverbund Asyl und Migration 2014; Deutsche Welle 2014; 
Zeldin 2014).  
Despite these reforms, additional barriers to labor market access may still hinder asylum 
seekers’ opportunities. Usually, they have to apply for an employment permit first, for which 
they have to prove they have a “concrete” job offer, i.e. an employer has to declare that the 
asylum-seeker will be employed in case the employment permit is granted, and they have to 
hand in a detailed job description to the authorities (Informationsverbund Asyl und Migration 
2014). Also, many accommodation centers are located in remote areas without easy access via 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
22 Until the September 2014 amendment, asylum seekers were required to stay in the same municipality 
to which they had been allocated for the whole duration of their procedure, and they could only receive 
financial benefits (cash and non-cash) in that town or district as part of the so-called “residence 
obligation” (legally: “geographic restriction”). Asylum seekers received a certificate of permission to reside 
that granted them a preliminary right to stay in Germany during the asylum procedure, but their 
residence permits did not allow them to leave their assigned town without permission from German 
authorities. They could not access benefits in other parts of Germany until they first received permission 
to relocate (Kalkmann 2014, 54, 63).  
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public transportation. If the place of residence is located far away from the next town, travel 
costs to work may pose an additional obstacle (Kalkmann 2014). 
Asylum seekers are prohibited from working on a self-employed basis for the whole 
length of their asylum procedure; a regular residence permit is a precondition to pursue self-
employment in Germany, and the asylum seeker's residence permit is not applicable (Kalkmann 
2015). Finally, conditions for access to vocational training are identical to the conditions for 
access to the labor market in general, so “priority review” also applies to any openings for 
vocational training. Additionally, many vocational training programs last two or three years, and 
if an asylum seekers’ application is rejected, he or she will not be able to complete the training 
(Kalkmann 2015, 65). Although asylum seekers’ access to the labor market and vocational 
training are fairly strictly controlled, the German legislation is in line with the EU Reception 
Conditions Directive. With regard to vocational training, the Directive only stipulates that 
Member States may grant asylum seekers access to vocational training, imposing no obligation 
to do so (Langer 2014).  
 
Social Rights for Admitted Refugees  
Successful applicants, who are granted asylum status or refugee status,23 are initially 
granted a three-year temporary residence permit (Aufenthaltserlaubnis, literally residence 
permit) and gain the same benefits as Germans within the social insurance system. They have 
unrestricted access to the labor market, and are entitled to the same social welfare benefits, 
healthcare, child benefits, and child-raising benefits as German nationals. They are also entitled 
to integration allowances and language courses, as well as other forms of integration assistance. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
23 Refugee status is granted in accordance with Section 3, paragraph 4 of the Asylum Procedure Act, which 
reproduces the 1951 Convention inclusion criteria. Asylum status is granted in line with Article 16a, 
paragraph 1 of the German Constitution, which states, “Persons persecuted on political grounds shall have 
the right of asylum” (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2011). 
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After three years the BAMF examines whether there are grounds for a possible withdrawal of 
their refugee or asylum status, such as a change in the political situation in their country of 
origin. If no reasons for withdrawal are found, their temporary residence permit is converted 
into a permanent residence permit (Niederlassungserlaubnis, literally settlement permit) 
(Federal Ministry of the Interior 2014; Federal Ministry of the Interior 2015; Kalkmann 2014).  
When successful applicants gain a temporary residence permit, their core family 
members (spouse or children) are automatically granted the same status if they are already in 
Germany. In addition, the requirements for family reunification are significantly more lenient if 
successful applicants apply for a residence permit for their family members within three months 
after they have received asylum or refugee status. If this is the case, core family members can 
join a refugee living in Germany even if the refugee does not fulfill all the requirements for 
family reunification, namely the requirement to provide their family member(s) with adequate 
living space and financial resources (Federal Ministry of the Interior 2015; Kalkmann 2014).   
Individuals granted subsidiary protection status or another form of (national) protection 
receive a temporary residence permit that lasts at least a year (in most cases two years). The 
BAMF usually extends these temporary residence permits, and it is possible to convert a 
temporary residence permit into a permanent one after five years. In implementing the recast 
Qualification Directive, Germany removed several restrictions to the rights and access of those 
granted subsidiary protection; their rights are now closer in line with rights for admitted 
refugees (BAMF 2014). First, the concept of international protection was introduced into 
German law, so an asylum application is now defined as both an application for “asylum” as 
defined in the German Constitution, and for international protection (refugee and subsidiary 
protection) as defined in the Qualification Directive. The definitions of refugee and subsidiary 
protection have also been added almost verbatim into the Asylum Procedures Act. People 
granted subsidiary protection status are now legally entitled to a temporary residence permit, 
whereas before they were entitled to a residence permit “as a rule,” meaning it could be denied 
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under certain circumstances. People were then usually left with a “tolerated” stay (Duldung). 
Now, those with subsidiary protection have almost unrestricted access to the labor market (they 
must still apply for a work permit, but it is usually granted) and are also entitled to social 
benefits, although with some restrictions in comparison to German citizens. However, family 
members do not automatically receive subsidiary protection status, and family reunification is 
only possible under strict conditions (Informationsverbund Asyl und Migration 2015). 
Individuals with subsidiary protection status must prove that they can provide adequate living 
space and sufficient financial resources to support all their family members in Germany. 
Typically, only a few individuals with subsidiary protection status can meet the requirements 
(Kalkmann 2014; Informationsverbund Asyl und Migration 2015). 
 
Social Rights for Third-Country Nationals  
Germany’s welfare regime, with its emphasis on work tests and contributions, in 
combination with restrictive aspects of its incorporation regime mean that it is considerably 
more difficult for third-country nationals to gain full access to social benefits than it is for 
admitted refugees. There are two major components of the Germany social security system: 
contribution-financed benefits provided by a social insurance agency and tax-financed benefits 
provided by the state. The first, core component – contribution-based statutory social insurance 
– comprises five branches: health insurance, long-term care insurance, pension insurance, 
accident insurance, and unemployment insurance. The tax-financed social welfare system grants 
benefits based on means-testing, regardless of contributions (Müller, Mayer, and Bauer 2013, 
12). The main access point for social benefits is labor market participation, and historically, the 
primary objective of the Bismarckian social insurance scheme has been to protect the standard 
of living of insured workers and their families. In principle, this should facilitate the social rights 
of foreign workers, too. Indeed, historically, German labor unions tried to incorporate foreign 
workers into the corporatist welfare state to avoid competing with them over wages and jobs and 
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also assumed some responsibility for integrating foreign workers and protecting their rights. In 
practice, though, certain aspects of Germany’s Christian democratic welfare regime limit foreign 
workers’ access to welfare schemes.  
First, rigorous work tests and contribution requirements prevent immigrants from 
accessing full benefits. For example, for pensions, the minimum insurance period (the qualifying 
period) is five years, which puts recent arrivals or others who are denied access to the labor 
market, at a distinct disadvantage. To receive a full pension, the contribution period is 45 years 
employment, which reduces retirement benefits for anyone who arrives after age 20, and 35 
years of work is required for early retirement. In addition, the government imposes tough 
contribution requirements for extended unemployment benefits, which create obstacles to 
entitlement (Sainsbury 2012; Müller, Mayer, and Bauer 2013). Second, benefits are earnings-
related, so Germans typically claim higher benefits than third-country nationals. The foundation 
of the German social insurance system is the so-called “standard employment relationship,” 
which refers to a “dependent, permanent full-time job with dismissal protection, full integration 
into status-protecting social insurance and collectively set wages significantly above the 
subsistence level” (Eichhorst and Marx 2009, 3). Only those people with a standard employment 
relationship can fully benefit from the social insurance system. People with flexible, low-paying, 
and/or intermittent employment – those further away from the standard employment 
relationship – receive less protection, and asylum seekers and third-country nationals tend to be 
disproportionately in jobs like these (Müller, Mayer, and Bauer 2013). Second, the close 
connection between the social security system and employment status makes it far more difficult 
for third-country nationals, who often have short-term, intermittent work, to reap the benefits 
of the contributions-based system.  
Third, non-German immigrants’ contributions tend to exceed the benefits they receive, 
which has been the case since the peak of Germany’s guest worker programs in the 1960s and 
1970s. Even though immigrants who entered Germany as foreign workers and their children 
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now utilize more benefits (particularly social assistance, housing allowances, and child 
allowances), they tend to use more lucrative insurance benefits far less, and thus remain net 
contributors to the system (Sainsbury 2012, 56). Finally, another crucial attribute of the German 
welfare system, the principle of subsidiarity,24 has obstructed the development of a 
comprehensive public program to assist with immigrants’ settlement. Instead, church and labor 
movement welfare associations have provided social services to foreign workers, largely along 
ethno-religious lines, and immigrant associations have been created to provide welfare for their 
own ethnic communities (Sainsbury 2012, 57).  
Regardless of the benefit type, social benefits are generally not tied to nationality or 
residence title; nevertheless, exclusionary aspects of Germany’s incorporation regime do restrict 
third country nationals’ access to certain benefits. First and foremost, the 2004 Immigration 
Law, passed by a SPD-Greens coalition in compromise with the conservative opposition, 
requires that foreigners prove their livelihoods are “secure,” “without recourse to public funds”25 
(including adequate healthcare coverage) before they can obtain a temporary or permanent 
residence permit (Müller, Mayer, and Bauer 2013; Sainsbury 2012). Third-country nationals still 
have full access to contribution-based benefits financed by their own contributions, but “no 
recourse to public funds” makes claiming tax-financed basic security benefits “problematic” 
(Müller, Mayer, and Bauer 2013, 16). Even though foreign workers are technically eligible for 
social assistance, applying for basic security benefits can also prevent them from having their 
residence permits renewed, and long-term use of social assistance for oneself or for family 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
24 According to the principle of subsidiary, the family and, after the family, welfare organizations are seen 
the locus of social order and social welfare. The state only performs welfare functions that are not 
performed well by the family or civil society. 
25 An important difference from the UK’s “no recourse to public funds” rule is that public funds under 
Germany’s 2004 law do not include child benefits, parental benefits, or benefits granted in order to enable 
residence in Germany (Sainsbury 2012: 64).  
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members is grounds for expulsion and has also disqualified immigrants from obtaining German 
citizenship (Müller, Mayer, and Bauer 2013; Sainsbury 2012). 
In practice, most foreign workers who claim social assistance simply do not have their 
residence titles renewed. However, given that claiming social assistance can have serious 
consequences for a foreigner’s residence status, third-country nationals are under considerable 
pressure to maintain employment (to ensure they have “secure” livelihoods) and often take “less 
favorable job offers” as a result. People with permanent residence permits face no consequences 
whatsoever for claiming social security benefits (Müller, Mayer, and Bauer 2013, 42). Given that 
admitted refugees are immediately granted a temporary residence permit, this puts them at an 
advantage compared to third-country nationals who must apply and who face many restrictions 
in doing so. 
The 2004 Immigration Law simplified the permit system by eliminating work permits 
entirely and reducing residence permits to two types: a limited residence permit and a 
permanent residence permit, or settlement permit. However, limited residence permit holders 
do not possess uniform rights and obligations; instead, the permit differentiates based on entry 
category, with differences for workers, students, family members, and asylum seekers. Also, 
even though the law eliminated work permits, the limited residence permit still specifies 
conditions of employment. Like the former restricted work permit, work authorization can limit 
the duration of employment, the type of occupational activity, the workplace, and the region. To 
obtain a permanent residence permit, the requirements have become stricter, and now include 
possession of a residence permit for five years, employment or adequate income, payment of 
insurance contributions for five years, no criminal record or record of anti-constitutional 
activities, German language skills, knowledge of the legal and social system and way of life, and 
adequate accommodation. However, highly-qualified workers can bypass these requirements, 
creating “a two-track system for the elite and the non-elite” (Sainsbury 2012, 65).  
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The 2004 Immigration Law also maintained the principle of “priority review,” which 
grants preferential treatment to German workers for filling jobs. Thus, a foreign worker with a 
restricted work permit will be hired only if no German, no EU-migrant, and no foreigner with an 
unrestricted work permit can fill the position. Employment is a fundamental condition for a 
residence permit, thus unemployment puts immigrants at risk. Essentially, “work has been a 
crucial nexus between the welfare and incorporation regimes in Germany”  (Sainsbury 2012, 
58). Although Germany watered down many of the most exclusionary aspects of its 
incorporation regime, its requirements for permanent residence and naturalization remain very 
strict (Sainsbury 2012, 66), creating large gaps in social rights between Germans and foreigners. 
Furthermore, its incorporation regime still differentiates based on entry category, leading to 
large discrepancies in the rights and social entitlements of asylum seekers, at the low end, and 
admitted refugees, EU migrants, and ethnic Germans (until recently) at the high end (Sainsbury 
2012, 64-65).  
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SWEDEN 
 
Overview 
Unlike the UK’s liberal regime and the Christian democratic welfare state in Germany, 
Sweden’s social democratic welfare state provides coverage to the entire population based on the 
principle of universalism. Public services in Sweden, especially healthcare, education, 
employment services, and childcare, are available to all persons resident in Sweden, regardless 
of their nationality or immigration status. Sweden’s welfare state combines citizen benefits and 
earnings-related benefits, which have quite different redistributive effects compared with the 
UK and Germany’s mixes of means-tested and work-related insurance benefits. In Sweden, 
citizen benefits provide basic security to everyone and earnings-related benefits provide income 
security to employees. Until recently, Sweden also differed from the other regimes because work 
tests were much less rigorous and contributions from the insured were less significant in 
determining entitlements.  
Another defining aspect of Sweden’s welfare system is its goal of full employment and 
the right to work for everyone. Active labor market policies have increased the proportion of 
economically active individuals in the working age population, meaning that more people 
qualify for work-related benefits, and Sweden has a considerably higher rate of labor market 
participation compared with the liberal and Christian democratic countries. Finally, Swedish 
social policies aim to reduce inequalities and promote egalitarian redistribution of resources; the 
country has lower rates of income inequality than other welfare regime types.  
Unlike the UK and Germany, the Swedish incorporation regime has been inclusive in the 
post-war period, with rights based on residence or domicile (ius domicilis). Sweden has 
simplified its residence permit system so that permanent residence permits are granted shortly 
after a person’s arrival in the country. Furthermore, it employs a much broader definition of 
refugee than other countries, provides equal treatment for Convention refugees and persons 
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granted asylum for humanitarian reasons, and has generous rules for family reunification. It has 
also introduced cultural and political rights for immigrants. For example, immigrant languages 
are included in school curricula and the state subsidizes ethnic associations. Immigrants gained 
the right to vote in 1975 and can run for public office, and they can hold public employment, 
unlike in Germany and the UK (Sainsbury 2012, 85). Requirements for naturalization are also 
quite liberal; Sweden’s rate of naturalization exceeded that of the United States in the 2000s.  
Compared with Germany and the UK, Sweden differentiates very little between social 
rights afforded to different immigrant entry categories. Social entitlement is based on residence 
(a feature of the welfare regime), and the simplified residence permit system grants settlement 
status almost immediately or within a few years (a feature of the incorporation regime). Only 
since the 1990s, following a period of massive welfare state downsizing, has there been a trend 
toward some restrictions of immigrants’ rights and growing differences between permanent 
residence status versus temporary residence status (Sainsbury 2012, 87). 
Sweden’s multi-party political system has been dominated by the Swedish Social 
Democratic Party (SAP, from the Swedish Sveriges socialdemokratiska arbetareparti, literally 
"Social Democratic Workers' Party of Sweden") since 1917. In only five general elections (1976, 
1979, 1991, 2006, and 2010) has the center-right bloc won enough seats in the Swedish 
Parliament to form a government. The dominance of the social democrats is a primary reason 
why Sweden has developed such a strong social democratic welfare state in the post-war period 
and why Sweden has one of the most inclusive immigration incorporation regimes in the EU. 
However, some of the inclusive aspects of Sweden’s regime have become “frayed” (Sainsbury 
2012, 94). Slightly more restrictive reforms were introduced by the center-right governing 
coalition in power from 1991 to 1994, including reductions in asylum seekers’ daily allowances. 
That said, SAP and the center-right in Sweden do not differ markedly in terms of attitude toward 
immigration – all mainstream parties have historically adhered to a pro-immigration consensus. 
It is also important to acknowledge that the center-right government lowered the allowances 
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during an economic downturn in Sweden, and when it also cut benefits for Swedish citizens in 
order to shore up the country’s finances (Sainsbury 2012).  
 
Reception Conditions and Benefits for Asylum Seekers 
After World War II, Swedish employers began actively recruiting foreign labor as the 
country’s export industry thrived, attracting many labor migrants from Finland, Germany, 
Greece, Italy, and the former Yugoslavia during the 1950s and 1960s. The flow of immigrants 
peaked in 1970, and Sweden did not set up a guest worker program like other countries to meet 
labor demands. In the 1950s and 1960s, the government cooperated closely with Sweden’s 
powerful trade union confederation (in Swedish Landsorganisationen i Sverige, commonly 
known as the LO) on the issue of recruiting foreign labor. Given the LO’s influence, recruitment 
of foreign labor was only possible as long as the labor unions accepted it, and the LO pressured 
the government not to allow cheap foreign labor. Instead, foreign workers received wages and 
labor rights at the same levels as native Swedes, including access to unemployment benefits. 
Sweden officially ended labor migration from non-Nordic countries in 1972, around the time of 
the 1973 oil crisis and global recession, when many Western European countries began to limit 
labor migration (Westin 2006). Since then immigration to Sweden has mainly comprised people 
granted asylum on humanitarian grounds. Like Germany, Sweden experienced a huge increase 
in asylum seekers in the 1990s. Among EU Member States, it has the highest proportion of 
asylum seekers per million inhabitants, largely due to its robust commitment to international 
protection and human rights and its encompassing definition of refugee (Fredlund-Blomst 
2014).  
Benefits for asylum seekers have changed several times since the 1980s, with the biggest 
reforms in response to Sweden’s economic downturn in the early 1990s. In the late 1980s, a law 
introduced special allowances for asylum seekers that replaced social assistance. The 
allowances, according to the law, were to guarantee an acceptable standard of living identical to 
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the minimum standard established in the Swedish Social Assistance Law. However, in 1992 the 
center-right-led government decreased these daily allowances by 10 percent; since everyone’s 
benefits were being reduced, the government argued that asylum seekers’ should be, too 
(Andrén and Andrén 2013). In 1994 the government lowered allowances again, but this time 
delinked them from the social minimum, reasoning that it was justified that asylum seekers 
have a lower economic standard than permanent residents during their application process, so 
the government should be able to calculate their allowances independently. The 1994 changes, 
part of larger reforms to the reception system for asylum seekers, also moved asylum seekers’ 
benefits from the area of social legislation to immigration legislation, effectively sweeping them 
into the background and removing them from the general public debate on social policy. Unlike 
most other social benefits, asylum seekers’ daily allowances were not raised when the Swedish 
economy recovered, and they have not been adjusted for inflation since they were originally 
reduced in 1994. Thus, even though asylum seekers’ benefits have been off the agenda in 
Sweden and have not generated as much controversy as in the UK and Germany, the results – a 
reduction of benefits and separation from the general social assistance system – are largely the 
same (Sainsbury 2012, 89). 
 
Framework and Responsibility 
The 1994 Reception of Asylum Seekers and Others Act is the key legal framework behind 
Sweden’s asylum system. Under the Act, the Swedish Migration Board (SMB, or in Swedish 
Migrationsverket) has full responsibility for carrying out asylum procedures, providing for the 
reception of asylum seekers, and making first instance decisions on their applications. The Act 
applies from the date an asylum seeker submits an application until he or she has been received 
by a municipality after being granted a residence permit (in the case of a successful application) 
or has left Sweden if his or her application is rejected. Asylum seekers only lose access to 
benefits under the Act if they go into hiding to avoid a refusal-of-entry or expulsion order 
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(Ministry of Justice 2009). The Act also applies to asylum seekers who are granted temporary 
protection under Sweden’s Aliens Act, “in the event of a mass influx of displaced persons,” but 
who are ineligible for registration in Sweden’s population registry (Caritas Sweden 2013, 41).  
 
Accommodation  
When asylum seekers first arrive in Sweden they are expected to report immediately to 
the closest office of the SMB to submit an asylum application. After this initial contact, asylum 
seekers are given two options for accommodation: staying with family, relatives, or friends, or 
staying in one of the reception centers provided by the SMB. Asylum seekers who choose the 
independent housing option simply have to give the address and contact details where they plan 
to stay. They receive a financial allowance similar to the financial allowance given to asylum 
seekers staying in accommodation provided by the SMB, but do not receive any extra allowance 
to cover rent. Rules regarding benefits are also the same. About 40 percent of all asylum seekers 
in Sweden stay in independent housing, but they can ask to be accommodated by the SMB 
instead at any time (Migrationsverket 2013).  
Accommodation provided by the SMB usually consists of rented, furnished, self-catering 
apartments in normal housing areas, or sometimes open reception centers. Families typically 
live together, while single people live in shared apartments, normally with at least two people 
per room. If asylum seekers do not have sufficient financial means to pay rent, their monthly 
allowance from the SMB includes funds to assist with housing. Local authorities pay for special 
reception centers or facilities for vulnerable groups and separate reception centers for 
unaccompanied minors, but they are reimbursed by the state on a standard and an individual 
basis (Migrationsverket 2013).  
Like the UK, Sweden also contracts accommodation out to private providers via renting 
private apartments, but the Swedish government remains far more involved in the process 
instead of delegating it entirely to the private sector. According to the SMB, a major strength of 
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the Swedish reception system is its flexibility. The government does not own its accommodation 
facilities but can expand or shrink its housing capacities relatively easily simply by renting more 
or fewer apartments (Migrationsverket 2013). Another strength is that asylum seekers live in 
normal residential areas, rather than living in reception centers separated from local 
communities, which should facilitate their integration. A final strength is that, unlike in most 
other countries, asylum seekers in Sweden have the choice to live with family, relatives, or 
friends, which essentially gives them the freedom to move anywhere in the country. This also 
means that the SMB does not have to provide accommodation for every asylum seeker, which 
would be a “great, if not impossible, task” (Migrationsverket 2013, 7; Abraha 2007). 
 
Allowances 
The SMB provides a daily allowance to asylum seekers who cannot support themselves. 
This covers food and the cost of clothes and shoes, medical care and medicine, dental care, 
toiletries, and leisure activities. The amount depends on age, marital status, and whether an 
asylum seeker lives in state-provided accommodation that includes meals. As of December 2012, 
single adults receive 90 euros per month in accommodation centers that provide food and 240 
euros in independent accommodation; adults living together receive 75 euros per month in 
accommodation centers with food and 210 in independent accommodation; and children up to 
17 years old receive 45 euros per month in centers with food and 165 euros per month outside of 
these centers (Caritas Sweden 2013, 34). Apart from daily aid, the SMB sometimes grants 
special one-time allowances, such as when an asylum seeker arrives in Sweden in the winter and 
needs warmer clothing or a new mother needs a baby stroller. Asylum seekers who have income 
or assets of their own have to pay for their own food and accommodation (Abraha 2007; 
Migrationsverket 2013). As mentioned above, this level of asylum support was set in 1994 and 
has not been raised since, thus asylum seekers staying in accommodation centers that include 
food receive much lower allowances than their counterparts in Germany. 
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The SMB organizes activities for asylum seekers aged 18 to 64. Typically, the activities 
include Swedish classes, but sometimes English and IT classes as well, and are designed to 
“contribute to a meaningful existence during the waiting period” and ultimately to ease asylum 
seekers’ integration in Sweden if they are granted residence permits (Ministry of Justice 2009). 
However, in the early 1990s the SMB tied asylum seekers’ daily allowances to these activities, 
meaning it can reduce or withdraw allowances if an asylum seeker does not participate in 
activities at the reception center without a reasonable excuse, or if an asylum seeker does not 
cooperate with the authorities in processing his or her application. These “sanctions” have also 
been introduced in relation to refugees’ introductory benefits (to be explained below) and 
represent a notable negative development in asylum seekers’ and refugees’ social rights (Abraha 
2007; Sainsbury 2012).  
 
Healthcare 
When asylum seekers first arrive in Sweden, the SMB pays for a full medical 
examination. After that, adults are entitled to free emergency or urgent medical and dental care, 
and pay 50 kronor (about 6 euros) for regular health or dental care. Other healthcare costs 25 
kronor (3 euros) per visit, and asylum seekers pay no more than 6 euros for prescription drugs. 
If they incur medical costs above 400 kronor (54 euros) for doctor’s appointments, medical 
transportation, and prescription drugs within six months, the SMB will compensate them for 
costs over that amount (Caritas Sweden 2013). Children under the age of 18 are entitled to the 
same healthcare as Swedish residents. Pregnant women receive free gynecological and maternity 
care and have the right to an abortion and to free contraceptive advice services (Abraha 2007; 
Migrationsverket 2013).  
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Education 
All children in Sweden between seven and sixteen have the right to basic education. 
Swedish municipalities are required to provide children of asylum seekers or asylum-seeking 
children with the same education as Swedish resident children, although asylum seekers are not 
required to attend, as Swedish children are. Children of asylum seekers generally begin in 
special classes but eventually are fully integrated into regular schools (Abraha 2007). They have 
the right to lessons in their mother tongue on a regular basis if there are more than five students 
speaking the same language in the area. Children between 16 and 19 theoretically have access to 
vocational education but typically must attend a preparatory course to improve their Swedish 
skills before being able to attend vocational courses. However, asylum seekers older than 18 
when they arrive cannot access secondary education; adult asylum seekers usually do not have 
access to Sweden’s education system.26 According to the SMB, consistent education for children 
is another rationale for providing long-term accommodation for asylum seekers because it 
ensures that asylum seekers do not constantly move in and out of municipalities, creating 
logistical problems for schools obligated to provide education to ever-changing groups of 
children (Migrationsverket 2013). The SMB compensates municipalities and county councils for 
the reception services they provide, including for education, pre-school activities, and school-
age childcare for asylum-seeking children; for costs related to the reception of unaccompanied 
minors who seek asylum; and, for the placement of asylum-seeking children in homes other 
than their own (Migrationsverket 2013; Caritas Sweden 2013).  
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
26 Until January 2012, the SMB provided Swedish language courses for adults, but discontinued the 
classes because it succeeded in reducing the waiting period for asylum decisions to three to four months 
and thus determined there was little utility in offering Swedish lessons. Some NGOs and churches still 
offer regular, shorter Swedish language courses (Caritas Sweden 2013). 
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Labor Market Access 
Asylum seekers in Sweden have general access to the labor market throughout the entire 
asylum process, starting the day after their arrival (except for Dublin cases27) (Ministry of 
Justice 2009). Normally, to work in Sweden requires a work permit, but the SMB exempts 
asylum seekers from this requirement if they can prove their identity.28 Their right to work lasts 
until a final decision on their asylum application is taken, as well as through all appeals 
procedures, and it can be extended beyond that if the applicant cooperates in preparations to 
leave Sweden voluntarily. Working affects asylum seekers’ access to their daily allowances, 
which are only provided to those who lack other income sources. Asylum seekers are required to 
declare what they earn, and the SMB decides if they still need support. Failing to declare income 
or falsifying the amount usually has negative consequence for an individual’s asylum case. Once 
they begin work, taxes are automatically deducted from asylum seekers’ monthly salaries 
(Abraha 2007; Migrationsverket 2013; Ministry of Justice 2009).  
Asylum seekers who find jobs but subsequently have their asylum applications rejected 
have the opportunity to switch from asylum seeker to labor migrant, provided they satisfy 
several conditions. To receive a work permit, a rejected asylum seeker must: 1) apply for 
permission to work within two weeks of the final asylum decision entering into force; 2) have a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
27 As mentioned in Chapter III, the Dublin Regulation establishes the principle that only one Member 
State is responsible for examining an asylum application. If an asylum seeker submits an application in 
Sweden but his fingerprints were first registered in Italy via the EURODAC database, the asylum seeker, 
then considered a ”Dublin” case, will be transferred to Italy, which will take charge of his application for 
asylum (European Court of Human Rights 2015 ; Migration and Home Affairs 2015).  
According to data from AIDA, in 2012 Sweden registered 8576 Dublin cases (both incoming and outgoing 
requests). Of the outgoing requests, Italy was the most frequent country with 3033 requests for transfer 
followed by Norway, Poland, Malta, and Germany. Effective Dublin transfers through the Migration 
Board to other countries implementing the Dublin Regulation were 2629 in 2012 (Caritas Sweden 2015).  
28 If they are not able to prove their identity when they initially apply for asylum, they can do so later and 
still be granted an exemption from a work permit in order to access the labor market.  Asylum seekers 
who “do not help to clarify their identity” do not receive the exemption from a having a work permit 
(Ministry of Justice 2009), however, those who cannot prove their identity can still work in internships 
for short periods of time (a maximum of three months in one workplace). This is only to help them gain 
work experience and practice their Swedish language skills, but they do not receive remuneration (Caritas 
Sweden 2013; Abraha 2007). 
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valid passport; 3) have had an exemption to work while an asylum seeker; 4) have been working 
for at least four months for the same employer prior to the date the SMB receives their 
application for a work permit; 5) receive a work contract to continue working for at least a year; 
6) have terms of employment on at least the same level as Swedish collective agreements or 
what is customary in the occupation or industry, including insurance coverage and salary level 
(and these terms must have also applied in the previous four months); and finally, 7) be offered 
a monthly pretax salary of at least 13,000 kronor (about 1,360 euros) which must also have 
applied to their previous four months of employment. If an applicant is able to satisfy these 
rather demanding requirements, he or she will receive a temporary permit of at least one year 
and at most two, and after four years of temporary permits will be able to apply for a permanent 
residence permit. The temporary permit allows for family reunification and the right of a spouse 
to work. The possibility to switch from asylum seeker to labor migrant was an innovation 
introduced by the current social democratic government in order to develop labor migration of 
third-country nationals to Sweden and to provide highly-qualified, rejected asylum seekers with 
skills Sweden needed with the opportunity to access the labor market. However, under this 
policy an individual’s labor market skills do not influence the assessment of his or her asylum 
application (Caritas Sweden 2013).  
Employed asylum seekers have the right to join the Swedish Municipal Workers’ Union, 
either through their employers or by contacting the union directly. If an asylum seeker fulfills 
certain general conditions, such as payment of membership fees and minimum length of time 
worked, then he or she can access unemployment insurance if unemployed for one year. 
However, asylum seekers cannot receive sickness allowances if they become ill while working. A 
person must either live or work in Sweden and be registered with the Swedish Social Insurance 
Agency in order to be covered by its benefits, but asylum seekers cannot register as residents of 
Sweden during their asylum procedure (Abraha 2007).  
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Social Rights for Admitted Refugees  
There are essentially three possibilities for the outcome of an asylum application in 
Sweden: 1) refugee status and a permanent residence permit; 2) temporary protection status 
and a temporary residence permit; or 3) rejection, followed by appeal or return. If the SMB 
makes a positive decision on an asylum application, then an asylum seeker is granted a 
permanent residence permit29 and the Swedish Public Employment Service places (settles) him 
or her in a municipality.30 The SMB sometimes only grants a temporary permit if it considers an 
individual’s protection needs to be temporary, although these are usually renewable. If the SMB 
rejects an application, the asylum seeker can either accept the decision and return to his/her 
home country, or appeal the decision to the Migration Court (Migrationsverket 2014a). Rejected 
asylum seekers can also apply for a work permit if they satisfy the numerous requirements 
described above.  
Successful applicants, who hold a residence permit based on refugee status, international 
protection status, or as a quota refugee,31 can receive introductory benefits if they enroll in an 
“introduction plan” with the Swedish Public Employment Agency (Migrationsverket 2014a, 14). 
In the late 2000s, Sweden introduced major changes in this introductory benefits system in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
29 In September 2013, the SMB reassessed the conflict in Syria and decided to grant all Syrian asylum 
applicants (including stateless persons from Syria) a permanent residence permit, regardless of whether 
they were deemed refugees with Convention status or persons in need of subsidiary protection. Before 
this, approximately half of all asylum seekers from Syria were granted permanent residence permits and 
half were granted temporary residence permits valid for three years. Since this decision, the number of 
applicants from Syria has significantly increased (Migrationsverket 2014b).  
30 Previously, this was the Migration Board’s responsibility, but a 2010 Act transferred it to the Swedish 
Public Employment Service, which now assigns new arrivals to a place of settlement in a municipality.  
31 Sweden’s refugee resettlement program dates back to 1950 and is one of the largest and oldest in the 
European Union. Each year the Swedish Parliament establishes a refugee quota and designates funding 
for the resettlement of between 1,700 and 1,900 persons in need of protection. In order to be selected for 
the quota, an individual must be registered as a refugee at the UNHCR. The UNHCR prioritizes which 
refugees will be presented and for which country, and each country participating in a resettlement 
program (currently 27 accept quota refugees) then decides whether to grant the person a residence permit 
(Migrationsverket 2014b; Fredlund-Blomst 2014).  
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order to assist refugees, who frequently face more obstacles than other groups to entering the 
labor force. The benefits became a state rather than a local government responsibility and they 
were standardized, so they are now equal across Sweden. In addition, to create work incentives, 
any additional income that newcomers receive from paid employment does not reduce 
introductory benefits, and they are more generous than social assistance. The introductory 
program – Swedish language classes, a course in Swedish society, and labor market training 
schemes – remains the same, but the reforms in the late 2000s capped the duration of 
introductory benefits at two years. A more serious restriction for refugees is that, just as the 
SMB introduced “sanctions” for asylum seekers who do not participate in organized activities, if 
refugees do not follow their “introduction plan,” this can affect their introductory benefits 
(Sainsbury 2012, 92). If a refugee participates full time, he or she can receive 308 kronor (32 
euros) per day, with possibilities for supplementary benefits for children or housing allowances 
(Migrationsverket 2014a, 14).  
As discussed above, successful asylum applicants are either granted a permanent or a 
temporary residence permit. Temporary residence permits are a fairly recent addition to the 
permit system, however. Between 1991 and 1994 the center-right government reintroduced the 
practice of issuing temporary permits in order to cope with the massive influx of asylum seekers 
at the time (almost 180,000 in those four years). The temporary permits lasted six months, 
which meant that those immigrants could not register as permanent residents and therefore 
could not access universal health insurance. Essentially, “the principle of domicile was 
converted from a mechanism of inclusion to one of exclusion” (Sainsbury 2012, 92). This was at 
the height of Sweden’s economic crisis and during a major spike in asylum applications; Sweden 
has since returned to granting successful applicants regular residence permits, or temporary 
permits lasting up to two years. Nevertheless, the resident permit system has become more 
complex, resulting in increased differentiation in rights by entry category (Sainsbury 2012, 92).  
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In summary, the fact that asylum seekers in Sweden have access to the labor market 
throughout their entire asylum procedure and can potentially enter Sweden as labor migrants if 
their application is denied sets Sweden’s reception conditions apart from the UK and Germany. 
Another difference is asylum seekers’ freedom to choose where they live (whether with friends 
or family or in state-provided accommodation) and by extension, their freedom to move around 
the country as they please, which until recently was curtailed in Germany. Successful applicants 
are granted a permanent or temporary residence permit, which grants them access to all 
residence-based social benefits and allows them to enter the labor market, from which they can 
access work-based benefits, too. Despite some restrictions added since the 1980s, including 
“sanctions” related to daily allowances or introductory benefits and the increasing use of 
temporary residence permits, Sweden’s inclusive incorporation regime and universal benefits 
based on residence grant asylum seekers and refugees considerably greater ease of access, speed 
of access, and higher benefit levels than in the UK or Germany. 
 
Social Rights for Third-Country Nationals  
Third-country nationals in Sweden essentially have the same access to welfare benefits 
as admitted refugees. Sweden’s social security system comprises residence-based insurance 
providing guaranteed minimum benefits and work-based, earnings-related benefits covering 
loss of income. Because the system provides universal coverage to anyone who is resident or 
working in Sweden, “the nationality or immigration status of a person is normally not a criterion 
for their access to social security benefits” (Migrationsverket 2014a, 7). Furthermore, a central 
principle of Swedish social security policy is that immigrants should not be subject to specific, 
separate rules only affecting them as a group on the basis of their nationality. Anyone who stays 
or can be expected to stay in Sweden for more than one year is normally considered a resident, 
regardless of his or her nationality. Most legal immigrants who receive a permit that is valid for 
more that a year are considered residents, and as a result, have the same access to social security 
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benefits as Swedish nationals or EU-nationals living in Sweden. Work-related social security 
benefits are based on a person working in Sweden, even if the period of employment is shorter 
than one year. No differences in work-related benefits are made on the basis of nationality or 
immigration status either (Migrationsverket 2014a).  
The most common residence-based cash benefits which everyone residing in the country 
may qualify for include: parental benefit (minimum guaranteed level), child allowance, child 
support, housing allowance, invalidity benefit (tax-financed part), assistance allowance, sick pay 
(guaranteed level), survivors’ benefits, and rehabilitation. The work-based cash benefits which 
everyone working in the country is entitled to include pregnancy allowance, parental benefits 
based on income, temporary parental benefits, old-age pension based on income, sick pay, 
sickness cash benefit, rehabilitation, child pension, income-related sickness compensation or 
activity compensation, and unemployment benefit. Work-based benefits cover a loss of income; 
the amount is dependent on a person’s income and has a ceiling (Migrationsverket 2014a).  
In the early 1990s, Sweden suffered a serious economic downturn, going from full 
employment to an unemployment rate of eight percent in 1993, where it stayed until 1998. The 
economy experienced negative growth for three consecutive years between 1991 and 1993, and 
the government’s budget surplus became a 12 percent budget deficit in 1993. As a result, the 
1990s were a decade of welfare state downsizing. In the first phase, the government tightened 
eligibility requirements, raised user fees, and generally cut benefit levels. However, unlike 
retrenchment strategies in the UK, which emphasized means-tested benefits, and Germany, 
which stressed the principle of equivalence, Sweden’s strategy, in keeping with the principle of 
universalism, cut benefits for almost everyone in Sweden. It did avoid cuts in public services – in 
particular education, healthcare, and childcare – in an effort to protect the most important 
universal benefits. The second phase of downsizing included more benefit cuts combined with 
tax increases to patch up public finances; by 1998, the budget was balanced again (Sainsbury 
2012, 87-88). 
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Even though Sweden’s retrenchment measures entailed cuts for everyone, some reforms 
disproportionately affected third-country nationals. First, immigrants generally suffered more 
than native Swedes as a result of the crisis; a sharp decline in their employment rate reduced 
their earnings and limited their access to work-related benefits, such as sickness and 
unemployment benefits (Sainsbury 2012, 88). In addition, reform of the pension system has 
seriously weakened immigrants’ future pension rights. The new system, which will be fully 
implemented in 2018, has stronger Bismarckian elements (work performance and 
contributions) in the state earnings-related pension, namely 40 years of employment and the 
calculation of benefits based on lifetime earnings, which both present a significant obstacle for 
immigrants. The other major change, the replacement of the basic pension with a guaranteed 
pension, lengthened the residence requirement to 40 years for citizens and non-citizens, which 
again erects a serious barrier for immigrants who begin working in Sweden after the age of 20 
(Sainsbury 2012, 88-89).  
Except for movements from other EU countries, labor migration was an insignificant 
part of migration flows to Sweden until 2008, when new legislation created an employer-driven 
labor immigration policy. The new system altered the recruitment system to allow employers to 
recruit third-country nationals for jobs if they cannot find Swedes or EU nationals to fill the 
roles (Fredlund-Blomst 2014). It also altered corporatist arrangements by removing labor 
market partners’ consultation and veto powers, and most importantly for immigrants’ access to 
social benefits, it changed permit requirements. Now, labor migrants are granted temporary 
permits and can obtain permanent residence permits after four years of employment, but the 
temporary permits are contingent upon employment and the ability to support oneself. That 
said, one condition for granting a permit is that pay, insurance benefits, and other working 
conditions of foreign workers are not below those in collective arrangements. Unlike many other 
EU countries, Sweden has not limited labor immigration to professionals or wealthy 
entrepreneurs. It did not introduce a point system like in the UK and did not impose wealth or 
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income requirements for social insurance access like in Germany. It has also not granted 
wealthy or highly paid labor migrants immediate access to a permanent residence permit, as 
Germany did (Sainsbury 2012).  
The implementation of EU Directives and the return of labor immigration “have been 
accompanied by a greater emphasis on employment and economic self-sufficiency as conditions 
of entry and stay” (Sainsbury 2012, 93). For instance, Sweden introduced maintenance 
obligations for family reunification in 2010,32 which has created a new differentiation in rights 
based on entry category. One of the government’s primary justifications for the change was that 
all other EU Member States have support obligations, thus EU influence may actually lead to 
more restrictive policies. The inclusive aspects of the Swedish incorporation regime have 
“become frayed” (Sainsbury 2012, 94), but compared with other EU Member States, Sweden 
remains conspicuously more inclusive. Moreover, it has not restricted immigrants’ access to 
social benefits as a strategy to discourage immigration. Residence remains the crucial 
intersection between Sweden’s welfare and incorporation regimes, which potentially provides a 
more inclusive foundation for social rights than need (UK) or work (Germany) (Sainsbury 2012).  
One notable change in immigration politics in Sweden, which may have consequences 
for future policies, is the recent rise of the Sweden Democrats, a far-right, anti-immigration 
party. The Sweden Democrats first achieved success in municipal elections in 2006 and in the 
2010 general election crossed the four percent threshold necessary to gain parliamentary 
representation, polling 5.7 percent and winning 20 parliamentary seats. In the 2014 general 
elections, the Sweden Democrats polled 13 percent and won 49 seats (14 percent) in parliament. 
The party argues for cutting immigration to Sweden by 90 percent. Mainstream parties and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
32 Like the maintenance requirements in Germany, the new rules for family member immigration 
introduced in Sweden require that a family member’s sponsor already resident in Sweden must be able to 
support himself or herself and must have adequate living space for himself or herself and the family 
member. However, the maintenance requirement does not apply if the sponsor has been granted a 
residence permit as a refugee or if the applicant for family reunification is a child and the sponsor is the 
child’s parent (Ministry of Justice 2011). 
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politicians of the left and right have called it “racist” and “neo-fascist” and have publicly called 
for maintaining Sweden’s inclusive refugee and asylum policies (Crouch 2014). The fact that the 
Sweden Democrats were able to gain so much electoral support, however, shows that Sweden’s 
historical pro-immigration consensus might be cracking as its encompassing welfare state faces 
economic pressures (Kuhnle 2000). Stockholm’s May 2013 riots, where disturbances broke out 
in several low-income neighborhoods with large first- and second-generation immigrant 
populations, illustrate that Sweden’s welfare state is under strain. Over the past decades, 
Sweden has witnessed some of the fastest and largest growths in inequality among OECD 
countries, and poor, largely immigrant communities have suffered disproportionately 
(McLaughlin 2013). While mainstream politicians maintain inclusive immigration rhetoric and 
expansive asylum policies, it remains to be seen how the Sweden Democrats’ rise and the rise in 
Sweden’s inequality will play out in the coming years. 
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CHAPTER V: CONCLUSION
Based on the country analyses in the proceeding chapter, several key characteristics 
stand out. The UK’s liberal welfare regime and restrictive immigration regime, in combination 
with restrictions depending on entry category, have created a challenging environment for 
asylum seekers and third-country nationals. The UK has added residency and naturalization 
requirements that restrict refugees’ access, too, which sets it apart from Sweden and Germany. 
Support for asylum seekers in the UK is minimal and provided on a purely means-tested basis. 
The British government contracts out asylum seekers’ accommodation to private companies and 
gives them no choice in where to live. Asylum seekers cannot access the labor market for at least 
a year, and if granted a work permit after that, they can only fill a small range of specialized 
shortage occupations. Successful applicants are granted leave to remain in the UK for five years, 
after which they must apply for settlement (ILR). If they do not apply “in time,” they risk having 
their full case reviewed again. The government has added additional language and knowledge of 
“life in the UK” requirements for refugees and immigrants applying for naturalization, yet has 
simultaneously reduced funding for English language classes and other integration programs.  
British welfare state restructuring, which introduced increased privatization of benefits 
and increased means-testing, significantly reduced third-country nationals’ benefit uptakes. The 
increased emphasis on “no recourse to public funds” and longer residence requirements mean 
that third-country nationals’ access to benefits is seriously restricted and many are left with no 
safety net at all during their first years in the country. The UK adopted the first round of 
common European legislation in asylum but has not opted into the recast versions and has also 
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not opted into any EU legislation concerning non-EU migrants, thus the EU’s influence in the 
UK is very limited.  
Germany’s Christian democratic welfare regime, with its focus on the “standard 
employment relationship” and linking benefits to work and residence, has led to vast differences 
between the benefits of asylum seekers and third-country nationals, on one hand, and Germans 
and ethnic Germans (to a lesser extent) on the other. Moreover, Germany’s restrictive 
incorporation regime sharply differentiates between Germans and foreigners, and entry 
categories separate individuals further still in terms of social rights and the right to work. 
Asylum seekers’ benefits fall under a completely separate welfare scheme and, until recently, 
were far below the “standard” social benefits. When the state cannot provide adequate 
accommodation and services for asylum seekers, welfare organizations, especially church 
organizations, step in to fill the gap. Germany recently shortened the time asylum seekers must 
wait to enter the labor market to three months; in practice, however, asylum seekers must wait 
at least 15 months while employers carry out “priority review” to see if a German citizen, EU 
migrant, or migrant with permanent resident status can fill the position instead. Admitted 
refugees are immediately granted a temporary residence permit, which grants them access to 
the same social benefits as German citizens and unrestricted access to the labor market. Their 
temporary permit is converted into a permanent permit after three years. Like Britain, however, 
Germany has introduced language requirements for naturalization.  
The situation is more challenging for third-country nationals. “No recourse to public 
funds” rules restrict their access to residence permits, and rigorous work tests and contribution 
requirements limit their access to standard social benefits and to the labor market. If 
immigrants apply for social assistance, they harm their chances of gaining permanent residence 
and citizenship. Unlike Britain, Germany has implemented the recast CEAS Directives. Partly in 
response to the requirements of the Reception Conditions Directive, Germany shortened the 
time asylum seekers must wait to enter the labor market from twelve to nine months (the 
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maximum allowed in the recast Directive) then to three months in a subsequent reform. In line 
with the Qualification Directive Germany has expanded the rights of those granted subsidiary 
protection, bringing them closer to rights for admitted refugees.  
Sweden’s social democratic welfare regime, inclusive incorporation regime, and minimal 
differentiation between entry categories have, not surprisingly, led to more positive outcomes 
for asylum seekers, admitted refugees, and third-country nationals. Social entitlement is based 
on residence, and Sweden has simplified its residence permit system so that permanent 
residence permits are granted shortly after a person’s arrival in the country. Benefits for asylum 
seekers are delinked from mainstream social assistance and fall below the social minimum. They 
have not been adjusted for inflation since they were originally reduced in 1994. In sharp contrast 
to Germany and the UK, Sweden gives asylum seekers the option to live with friends or family in 
independent housing or in state-provided accommodation. Moreover, asylum seekers can enter 
the labor market the day after they submit their asylum application, and if their application is 
rejected, they have the opportunity to apply to enter Sweden as labor migrants. Admitted 
refugees instantly receive a permanent residence permit and can also access introductory 
benefits if they enroll in an “introduction plan.” 
Most legal immigrants who receive a permit that is valid for more than a year are 
considered residents, and as a result, have the same access to social benefits as Swedish 
nationals or EU-nationals living in Sweden. However, immigrants generally suffered more than 
native Swedes during Sweden’s economic crisis; their comparatively high unemployment rate 
limited their access to work-related benefits, such as sickness and unemployment benefits. Since 
2008, when Sweden opened up again to labor migration, it has placed greater emphasis on 
employment and economic self-sufficiency as conditions of entry and stay. Sweden now 
differentiates between permits: labor migrants are granted temporary permits and can obtain 
permanent residence permits after four years of employment, but the temporary permits are 
contingent upon employment and the ability to support oneself. The inclusive aspects of the 
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Swedish incorporation regime have been worn down, yet Sweden remains noticeably more 
inclusive when compared with other EU Member States. Additionally, it has not restricted 
immigrants’ access to social benefits as a strategy to discourage immigration. 
In summary, in each of the countries examined in this thesis, reception conditions for 
asylum seekers and social rights for admitted refugees and third-country nationals vary widely. 
Given that each country was selected for having a distinct welfare and immigrant incorporation 
regime, this is not entirely surprising. Social benefits for citizens vary across the three welfare 
regimes, therefore it is to be expected that the social rights for various immigrant entry 
categories do as well. However, several commonalities stand out. The first is the general low 
levels of support for asylum seekers across all three countries, even exemplary Sweden. It would 
be convenient to blame this on incomplete implementation of the EU’s asylum Directives, but in 
reality, the CEAS sets the bar low for harmonized reception conditions, even in its recast, 
“improved” version. Essentially, efforts to harmonize the national asylum policies of the 
individual Member States along a uniform set of basic, minimum standards of protection have 
stalled, and asylum seekers continue to receive and experience differential treatment depending 
on which Member State handles their claim to protection (Gardella 2013). In all three countries 
in this thesis, asylum seekers receive very low levels of material support, have minimal access to 
healthcare, and face considerable barriers to labor market access, even if their labor market 
restrictions are lifted in principle.  
The second commonality is that in each country there are huge discrepancies between 
social rights granted to various immigrant entry categories. Asylum seekers always fall at the 
bottom, admitted refugees tend to be near the top, and third-country nationals are somewhere 
in the middle, depending on the country’s welfare and incorporation regime. Furthermore, while 
Sweden does not distinguish between categories of labor migrants, both Germany and the UK 
maintain very different benefit levels and residence requirements for unskilled or low-skilled 
versus high-skilled immigrants. This stratification of rights between entry categories has serious 
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ramifications for those at the bottom. In the short term, thousands of asylum seekers are 
destitute or near-destitute because they receive the bare minimum, or less than the bare 
minimum, of social benefits. In addition, third-country nationals often face severe restrictions to 
social benefits. In the long term, this means asylum seekers, admitted refugees, and third-
country nationals are very poorly integrated. 
Moving forward, this presents EU countries like the UK, Germany, and Sweden with 
serious challenges, but also opportunities for improvement. In the short- to long-term future, 
policymakers in Europe will encounter two huge challenges: population aging and the increasing 
volatility of labor markets. Both of these necessitate changes to social security and healthcare 
systems in order to meet the needs of a rapidly growing retired population and to adequately 
provide income maintenance for displaced workers. Migration from third countries is generally 
seen as part of the solution to plug gaps in the labor market and to support Europe’s aging 
populations. However, as this thesis has discussed, third-country nationals tend to suffer 
disproportionately during cyclical economic downturns and simultaneously encounter complex 
rules and restrictions in order to access social benefits (Jonjić and Mavrodi 2012). Social 
security systems constitute one of the most powerful tools to reduce poverty and inequality and 
to promote social inclusion and dignity. By providing security for individuals against major 
social risks, including unemployment, sickness, and disability, social security systems help to 
enhance general productivity, increase individuals’ employability, and support sustainable 
economic growth. The following paragraphs will illuminate areas where national welfare states 
and the EU can improve their policies in the coming years.  
First, restrictive measures for asylum seekers in terms of accommodation (and 
detention, in some countries) tend to fuel the same public distrust and hostility toward asylum 
seekers that they are intended to address. For instance, many Member States’ practices of 
detaining asylum seekers in jail-like facilities links asylum seekers with criminality in the public 
imagination, “creating the impression that asylum seekers are something from which the public 
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needs to be protected” (Gibney 2011). Furthermore, policies of dispersal, like those in the UK 
and Germany, may actually exacerbate social conflicts rather than achieving their stated goal of 
minimizing social tensions. By separating asylum seekers from friends and co-ethnic groups 
living larger cities and inserting them into often already-marginalized communities, asylum 
seekers may place additional burdens on already-stretched public resources in these places. 
Even if the communities do not initially react negatively, this significantly increases the chances 
of community backlash. The Swedish riots in 2013 are a case in point, as additional pressures on 
already poor communities ultimately erupted into violence.  
Another shortcoming with long-term ramifications is the continued restriction of labor 
market access for immigrants of all entry categories. This limitation is most acute for asylum 
seekers, who must wait at least 15 months to access the labor market in Germany and have 
extremely limited access after 12 months in the UK. The lack of a right to work makes asylum 
seekers reliant on state welfare and accommodation, which only confirms public stereotypes 
that asylum seekers are simply a drain on the public resources and do not contribute to society 
(Gibney 2011). Labor market restrictions also have important consequences for admitted 
refugees who, despite instantly gaining access to the labor market once they are granted 
international protection status, have had little to no opportunity to gain practical labor market 
experience in their new country and often lack the requisite language skills. Thus, barriers to 
their labor market access still exist in practice.  
Granting earlier access to the labor market would promote asylum seekers’ and refugees’ 
social inclusion and self-reliance, give them a head start on the integration process, and avoid 
the loss of their existing skills. Furthermore, for the host society, more employed asylum seekers 
means increased tax revenues and savings in accommodation and other support costs and 
reduces illegal working (UNHCR 2011). The EU’s common asylum legislation states that 
Member States must grant asylum seekers access to the labor market after a maximum of nine 
months. A far better policy would be to grant asylum seekers immediate access, like Sweden 
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does, and increase funding for integration measures for all categories of immigrants, rather than 
dramatically cutting them, as many countries have done lately.  
Looking at the EU level, it is obvious that responsibility for asylum seekers is not equally 
distributed across all Member States. The three Member States in this thesis, along with Italy 
and France, registered 70 percent of all applicants in 2013 (Bitoulas 2014), and southern 
Member States continue to face increasing burdens on their asylum systems due to arrivals by 
sea. Given the high stakes, which include possible loss of human life during dangerous sea 
crossings, greater EU cooperation in terms of shared financing, expertise, and more equitable 
distribution of asylum seekers is essential. Most important in the EU policymaking arena is that 
asylum legislation and protections for third-country nationals should not be a race to the 
bottom. The UK in particular has intentionally restricted benefits for asylum seekers and other 
immigrants in order to discourage more immigration, yet thousands of people still arrive every 
year. All EU Member States should aim for high protection standards within their asylum 
systems to enhance both the efficiency and fairness of EU asylum procedures (Gardella 2013; 
Sampson 2013; UNHCR 2011). Ultimately, an asylum system which fails to protect the legal 
rights of asylum seekers and refugees also fails to uphold the core values of the EU.  
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